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Preface
The Australian Government is providing leadership in implementing the Building
and Construction Action Agenda—designed to create a world class business
environment and lift national competitiveness of the Australian construction
industry. Industry and Government leaders are working together to create a
marketplace that rewards enterprise and encourages firms and individuals to
make the most of their talents. The Building and Construction Action Agenda
aims to deliver measurable benefits that result in higher productivity levels,
stronger investment and job growth.
The Australian building and construction industry is undergoing dramatic change.
Challenges facing the industry include globalisation, advances in technology,
environmental factors, and changes in the structure of the Australian economy.
As public and private sector clients increasingly seek single source solutions,
there is a need for the various sectors of the industry to cooperate as a seamless
provider of design, finance, construction and maintenance services. The
underlying supply chains and business systems within the industry need to be
redefined and move from a short term project-to-project culture to one which is
more strategic, long term and enduring. Networks of firms provide greater
integration, financial strength and stability, allowing firms to respond effectively to
emerging opportunities.
This book Relationship-based Procurement Strategies for the 21st Century, is an
important foundation document to better understand social and industry drivers
from traditional adversarial contracting techniques to a more relationship-based
approach building on the strengths of individual partners. This publication has
evolved from the Commonwealth Government’s sponsorship of the case study of
The National Museum of Australia Project—the first building construction project
(as distinct from a resource development or engineering project) undertaken by a
project alliance anywhere in the world. We expect the opening of the National
Museum in March 2001 to be an important Australian architectural and
construction achievement. The successful implementation of project alliancing in
the construction of the National Museum of Australia will confirm it as one of the
preferred modes of delivering complex constructed facilities in this country.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The final edition of the Australian magazine Business Review Weekly (BRW) for
the 20th century reflected upon several major topical issues facing business and
society. Generally, these revolved around how companies face competition and
the nature of this competition. It becomes obvious from the issue of that
magazine and others published at the close of the 2nd millennium that our
understanding of competition has become more refined. Solutions that face up to
competitive challenges have become more widely understood.
For example in one of the BRW articles it was noted that "As companies try to
grapple with globalisation, trade liberalisation and the explosion in information
technology, they are forming complex networks of alliances. These alliances are
blurring the lines between co-operation and collaboration, and challenging the
whole notion of competition" [1]. Moreover in this same magazine issue
discussion of the virtual organisation and the impact of outsourcing reinforced the
notion that intangible assets—such as intellectual capital, talent and creative
spirit—provides a clue to why it is necessary for companies to form alliances [2].
The issue of attracting and retaining talented people was given substantial
attention [3-5]. The third major theme raised in the BRW magazine was the
influence of e-commerce, IT and globalisation on business and society. In
summary, globalisation has opened up previously protected and sheltered
markets. IT and more particularly the Internet, with e-commerce as its most
recent manifestation, has facilitated inexpensive and effective access to a global
customer base.
Customer expectation has risen in response to the promise of the brave new
internet-enabled world. An interesting situation has arisen whereby customers
perceive themselves to be kings and demand a variety of solutions to their
needs. Low product/service cost is one dimension of competition that has not yet
disappeared but it has been eclipsed by the more sophisticated concept of value
for money. Different customers perceive value in diverse terms. For some
customers, value or service means saving time that would otherwise be wasted.
For others, waste minimisation extends to business systems integration so that
desires can be seamlessly fulfilled through integrated procurement delivery and
payment systems - taking the pain and hassle out of contract administration. In
such cases, there appears to be a work ethic of conservation of energy being
applied in order that value is created for the customer in the simplest and most
direct manner. Also, each member of a supply chain views each other member in
that chain as an upstream or downstream customer. Thus, there is a tendency for
people to form alliances to produce a complementary value chain.
The concept of strategic advantage through creating value was first more widely
discussed in the late 1980's [6]. This was a novel approach as the conventional
wisdom at that time was that business's purpose was to add value to the
Chapter 1 - Introduction
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company's shareholdings through increased profits and company share value.
The idea of a company's purpose as providing value to the customer has been
widened during the later years of the 20th century to encompass other
stakeholders, most notable 'the community' [3, 7]. Increasingly, environmental
issues, waste minimisation and ethical business practices all form part of the
'value' that customers seek and indeed demand.
So, how is the traditional business enterprise to respond? Many still flounder in
an attempt to both understand customer demands and to respond positively and
satisfactorily to these. Some firms choose to acquire existing companies to gain
access to customers or to attempt to match or shadow their culture, ethos, or
other important characteristics. This approach is common in creating a regional
or local presence but it can be expensive, time consuming and highly risky due to
operating in unfamiliar environments. A similar and potentially risky response is
forming joint ventures with local firms. Forming partnership arrangements has
been yet another response as has developing virtual organisations from separate
organisations. These partnered organisations seek to differentiate themselves
though maximising value offered to customers by providing diverse resources
and responding with diverse management approaches. In each approach, the
aim is to provide customer value through offering something additional or more
diverse than can be provided by the firm without resorting to permanent structural
changes to the company.
What is required of these companies wishing to offer greater customer focus?
The answer lies in adopting an intelligent approach through understanding
customer diversity and its implications upon market demand and the supply of
the firm's required resources. However, most companies have a relatively fixed
workplace culture and organisational style at any point in time. Coping in an agile
way to respond to diversity is difficult. It is much easier and more effective for
firms to acquire an organisation that matches a particular customer's culture,
style and characteristics. The problem with this approach is that establishing a
new organisation or absorbing others through mergers or acquisitions demands a
lot of management energy. It is far better to find an appropriate organisation with
which to form a partnership/alliance relationship that already has complementary
customer characteristics or can more easily acquire them. Alliances provide a
tool for creating agility in response to the diversity in skills, work culture and
business practices that characterises customers. Thus an alliance's raison d'être
is a market driven response to change, globalisation, business process alignment
and aims to achieve customer focus.
Alliances can be more focussed upon the achievement of commonly agreed
goals than are looser arrangements such as one-off joint ventures. There are
many similarities between alliancing and partnering. Partnering can be relatively
distinct in terms of team co-commitment so that cooperation is the resulting
relationship. Partnering can also be more organisationally integrated with teams
collaborating closely operating under separate risk and rewards profiles to
Chapter 1 - Introduction
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achieve aligned objectives. However with partnering, teams or team members
can still be left unaided to sink or swim if circumstances turn against them. With
alliancing, there is a coalescence of organisational team members with shared
risk and reward schemes that are dependent upon the level of project not
individual team success attained in meeting customer needs. The Australian
National Museum Project is a prime example of this approach in the building
industry [8]. Others Australian examples, such as the Wandoo B Offshore Oil
Platform and the Andrew Drilling Platform Project in the process engineering
industry, have been widely reported upon [9, 10]. Alliancing arrangements means
that if agreed key performance measures are not met then both overhead and
profits for the project will be at risk for all members of the alliance. Similarly, for
successful outcomes, rewards are shared through agreed formulae to alliance
members. Thus, in alliancing, there is greater likelihood of shared commitment
resulting in a coalescence of teams than would be the case in other forms of
cooperation and/or collaboration.
We attempt in this book to offer a path for future procurement decision-makers to
achieve a satisfactory result that meets the needs of a wider range of project
stakeholders that was considered valid for much of the 20th century. The
examples drawn from the final BRW magazine of the 20th century indicates a sea
change in the way that projects will be delivered in the 21st century. The manner
in which coalitions of interests will be brought together to deliver projects, and the
perceived extent of project success, will be judged by project stakeholders.
These stakeholders will reflect a more diverse and complex group that the paying
customer or client that was generally understood in the 20th century [11].
We can nostalgically gaze backwards to a period when a handshake or pledge
was a bond and commitment to honour an agreement. However, we must
recognise that new times redefine the context in which we make and honour
agreements. We have learned much from the lunacy of the litigious and win-lose
mentality that was so heavily and consistently criticised in the 20th century
construction industry [12-15].  Alliancing offers much that is attractive to both the
customer and service/product provider.
This book is organised in four chapters. This first chapter provides an introduction
to the subject. The second contains a brief discussion of various forms of project
procurement options and these are explored to draw out important factors that
influence project success. In the third chapter we discuss the underpinning
issues that sustain and affect partnering and alliance relationships such as trust,
commitment, use of power, and organisational style and form. In the fourth
chapter we present a detailed discussion of partnering and alliancing prevalent in
the 20th century that we believe will evolve more fully during the 21st century. In
that chapter we also present examples of strategic project partnering and
strategic alliances and discuss its performance. We also highlight an example of
a model alliancing project, the Australian National Museum Project.
Chapter 1 - Introduction
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In preparing this book we have summarised the literature and identified six
challenges facing the delivery of projects. Table 1-1 illustrates this framework in
which we offer six generic solutions to problems posed by these challenges.
Table 1-1 Six 'Real' Challenges Facing Facility Procurement Decision-Makers
Challenges Problem Solutions
1. The 'cheapest' initial capital price is seldom
the most economic long-term solution
1. Procure projects on the basis of 'best
value' not 'cheapest initial price'
2. Negative conflict-ridden approaches result
in a litigious atmosphere in which win-lose
mentality prevails locking out many
creative solutions and win-win possibilities.
2. Use an agreed problem solving approach
and dispute resolution mechanism that
recognises the validity of diversity of
opinion and approaches providing a
greater pool of solution possibilities.
3. Stakeholder-value generating possibilities
are seldom revealed through a short-term
profit gain or capital cost-reduction focus.
This approach constrains solutions to a
win-lose outcome and is not conducive to
encouraging win-win outcomes.
3. Focus on satisfying the real needs of
stakeholders A focus on developing and
maintaining long term relationships often
releases creative energies and synergies
that reduces wasted energy and increases
wider knowledge and experience for all
project parties involved.
4. Project participants and their supporting
communities often experience detrimental
quality-of-life impact through an unhealthy
focus on profit maximisation or initial cost
reduction. Often supporting communities
pay a high indirect cost for projects.
4. Business needs to recognises that its
raison d'être is to increase community
value rather than simply maximise its own
wealth. Businesses survive and are
sustained by supporting communities,
which generates market demand and
creates prosperity.
5. The environment is often degraded when
the cheapest initial cost and bottom-line
profits are relentlessly pursued. The
consequences of waste generation are
often borne by the community rather than
those who have generated it.
5. The TQM approach in its fullest sense
should be adopted. Each project must not
degrade the external environment or the
supporting social system for which the
project is intended to serve.
6. Project stakeholders include a diverse
group of individuals including project team
participants and others who will be
ultimately affected by the project.
6. Recognise that performance criteria extend
beyond low initial cost or profit margins. A
more balanced scorecard of project
success should prevail that satisfies a
wider scope of project stakeholder.
Individual organisations should recognise that while they may operate inside a
formal alliance as discussed in this book, they are subject to judgement of their
actions by a wide community of interests. Project alliances need to appreciate the
broad range of community values and address them to truly achieve long term
success by creating sustainable projects. The judgement of corporate or project
success is increasingly being seen as a function of financial, environmental and
social performance. This triple bottom line is an emerging issue highlighted as
one of the 21st century's pressing challenges [7]
_________________________________________________________________
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CHAPTER 2. PROCUREMENT CHOICES
We generally use construction projects in this book to illustrate procurement
examples, however, other business sectors embrace similar procurement forms.
Manufacturing car, ship, and aerospace assemblies often use a form of design
and construction [16, 17].
This second chapter explores procurement options using a cost risk perspective.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the continuum along which the project delivery systems can be
categorised. At one extreme lies the traditional 'fixed cost' (and usually fixed time)
project. At the other is the fully cost reimbursable project. Procurement options for
clients can be viewed through a cost risk/relationship risk perspective. The initial
tender cost can be fixed with all risk being absorbed by the contractor.
Alternatively, the client can absorb a cost risk by letting variable sum contracts
adopting an open book philosophy in which incurred costs are verified or a
formulated schedule of agreed rates for various aspects of the work is agreed upon.
High High 
Contractor
Cost Risk Owner
Cost Risk
Traditional 
Lump Sum
Fixed $/Time
7. Full cost 
Reimbursable
2.
Design + 
Construct
or
Turnkey
4.
CM
PM
3.
Novation
5.
On-call
 multi-task 
contracting
6.
Guaranteed
maximum 
price (GMP)
1.
BOT BOO
BOOT (total package)
Figure 2-1 A Construction Cost Continuum for Project Delivery
2.1.  Traditional Procurement Options - Fixed Price Contracting
The traditional, or conventional, approach to procuring projects involves discrete
design development, tender and contract award and construction delivery phases.
Each phase is, in theory, separate and distinct. The process begins with a client
approaching the principal design consultant. This is generally the architect for
building projects or a design engineer for engineering projects. The design is
developed to as close to 100% complete as possible before tenders are invited. In
practice there are many design issues left incomplete and unresolved so there is
often refinement and amendment of design details during the project delivery
phase. Tenders are invited on one of two bases. Open tendering allows anyone to
tender for the project. Closed or pre-qualified tendering restricts those invited who
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have met pre-tender qualification criteria such as demonstrated financial soundness
and relevant project experience.
Open or pre-qualified tender competition using the traditional approach almost
always results in acceptance of the 'cheapest' fixed price for the specified work.
Tenders are called after the completion of design and the construction cost is then
assumed to be 'fixed'. However, in practice the design is almost never completely
finalised and most cases this results in many opportunities to claim for 'extras'. The
final end cost of a project, however, also includes the costs of design changes
approved during construction, charges based on errors or omissions in design and
contract documents used during the tender period and other claims made for
consequential delays arising from cost claims noted above. Thus, the 'traditional'
procurement method often ends up delivering the tendered lowest price for a
project and subsequent claims for additional works means that many clients feel at
the mercy of contractors seeking opportunities to create profit and additional
revenue. This situation is not new and has been the subject of much discussion
over decades both in Australia and overseas [12-15, 18].
The main criticism of the traditional lump sum approach has been that it invites a
confrontational approach over disputes arising out of contract variations and what
might be a fair price for these. The 'No Dispute' report was particularly scathing
about this propensity [12].  An entire claims industry has developed over past
decades to advise contractors on how to claim for extra work, and client
representatives on how to counter such claims. The traditional approach also casts
roles in stone for all parties making it difficult to negotiate outside the risks of the
contract. The system is widely held in disrepute but unsophisticated or
inexperienced clients are generally unaware of the advantages of alternative
procurement paths and/or such options appear more complicated than the
'traditional' approach. Also, the level of familiarity with this approach for most
contractors and clients can also be appealing, none of these parties particularly like
the game as played but each at least knows the rules. The apparent attraction of
the 'traditional method' as delivering the 'market' or cheapest price, at least initially,
is widely attributed to its continued popularity [13].
One of the disadvantages that this system presents is that it removes the contractor
from the design development phase and thus much management and
constructability information is lost [19, 20]. This has serious consequences in terms
of both cost and relationship risk. The contractor has much to offer in terms of
advice on how best to meet design specification in a cost and time effective manner
because the contractor is closest to the workface with intimate knowledge of the
production process [20]. Research on contract claims from the perspective of
contractors and designers and employers has highlighted the impact of poor design
coordination and subsequent design changes to make design details workable [21,
22]. Similarly, relationship aspects are impaired under the traditional procurement
system because the contractor is answerable to the principal design consultant with
no formal direct access to the client to suggest improved design for constructability.
Chapter 2 - Procurement Choices
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2.2.  Total Package Options - BOO, BOT, BOOT
Another option that occupies the fixed-cost end of the project procurement risk
spectrum is the total package option. In this procurement option a client's project
need is met by an entity that contracts to design, build, operate, own for some
period of time and transfer the facility back to the owner. In the BOO, BOT, BOOT
the 'B' represents the word 'build', the first 'O' as 'operate' and the second 'O' as
'own' and the 'T' as 'transfer'.  This option has been in operation for decades. There
are many examples of these projects in most countries of the world. Two useful
texts on this subject describes the use of BOT in Hong Kong and elsewhere [23,
24].  BOT requires that "contracted parties must accept the conventional wisdom
that risk should be assumed by the party within whose control the risk most lies. A
major function of the BOT arrangement is, therefore, to recognise and provide a
mechanism for the assignment and management of those risks" [24].
With the BOT 'family' of procurement options an alliance or joint venture group
forms to provide a facility for a client for which the client makes a concession
agreement to fund the facility until that facility's ownership is transferred to the
client. This arrangement is more common for infrastructure projects than buildings
because the concession allows for tolls or other payments to be made by end-users
to cover the cost of both procuring the facility and its operation. Extensions of this
idea have been cited in which buildings have been renovated and leased back on
this basis and others where the facility is required to be removed and the site
returned to an acceptable environmental standard. One advantage of this
arrangement is that it extends the ideas of constructability further to embrace life
cycle cost effectiveness. If the entity proposing the design solution is responsible for
maintaining and operating the facility then they will have the incentive to reduce
long term costs and thus develop a highly cost effective product over the product
life cycle  [23].
The BOT entity undertakes financing, design and construction as well as operation
and so the client is taking no direct cost risk other than the possibility that the facility
does not meet its needs or that the concession agreement is unsatisfactory [25].
The cost of establishing the arrangements can be considerable, as there are legal
and financing costs to be met. These should be compared with the client's legal and
finance costs in undertaking the project in other forms or options. Clearly, the option
is unlikely to be viable for projects of small scope, however, governments are
increasingly using this option for hospitals, prisons and other projects previously
undertaken through other options outlined in this section [26].
As a cautionary note, experience with BOT/BOO/BOOT schemes reveals some
notable failures. Generally these have been based on failures of trust and/or
communication. One of the most prominent failures has been the Bangkok
Second Stage Expressway. The competitive  tender phase took two years to find
a successful bidder. Part of the complexity derived from the land procurement
process to allow the project to proceed. At the date when work was supposed to
start only 1% of the land required was available. That problem was overcome but
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as the completion of the construction phase neared, other fundamental problems
regarding the operation emerged. Toll rates were decreased instead of being
increased to fund the project. This led to loans being frozen in response to
financier's concerns about the financial sustainability and then arguments broke
out over the right to operate the expressway. The project environment
subsequently dissolved into acrimony amongst accusations of corruption and
widespread political interference. Thus, both relationship and cost risks were
severely affected by the Thai government changing its mind [23, 27 ]. Clients and
stakeholders involved in such projects can be severely affected by the integrated
nature of finance, design and construction.
2.3.  Design and Construct, Novation and Turnkey
A design and construct (D+C) procurement approach provides for an organisation
to be contracted by a client to manage the design and construction processes with
a single point of contact. There may have been preliminary sketch plans developed
to indicate a generalised design solution or the design brief may be left fairly open
for the D+C contractor to offer proposals. In combined project management and
construction management (PM/CM) procurement options, an organisation
undertakes to represent the client in leading the design team, and undertakes the
management of the construction process including providing construction advice
during design development. The PM/CM entity may act as advisor (in which case
the managerial links are persuasive rather than directive) or may undertake the
work under a contractual arrangement in which it carries financial risk. In a D+C
arrangement, this team will hire both design team members and construction
management team members either within the design and construction company
entity or as sub-contractors. The design team may be sourced from in-house staff
or, as is more frequently the case, sourced from the general pool of design
consultants undertaking a variety of procurement forms [28]. Thus in many cases,
the design and construction contractor subcontracts or forms a joint venture with
design team firms. It can be appreciated that PM/CM and D+C blur quite
substantially as procurement system options so that a PM/CM entity that carries
financial risk is really a D+C contractor.
In tendering for a D+C project, design consultants are generally contracted to
develop concept (or concept advanced in terms of design developed) project
solutions to enable design and construction tenderers to be bid for the project.
The client has the opportunity to work with the design team to develop a brief to a
stage in which it can test the market for proposals that will develop a project
solution based upon the concept design produced as part of the brief. A selection
procedure is then put in place to evaluate the D+C proposals but those
submitting ideas and developed plans have the opportunity to provide innovative
solutions and take the concept and provide their own footprint on the result. This
has several potential advantages:
· it provides for innovative solutions to be tested by the market;
· it often results in a cost effective solution;
· it combines the expertise of both design and construction professionals; and
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· it allows the client to have a single point of contact that manages the project if
it wishes or in the case of PM/CM can maintain contractual control and
essentially use this group as its internal design and construction group.
The relationship experience for project teams also moves towards treating design
and construction supervision entities as being contributing partners in an enterprise
to deliver a project solution that combines the skills of both design and construction
groups. Dulami and Dalziel undertook a study of 37 managers of the construction
team of whom 22 were involved on traditionally procured projects and 15 on D+C
projects. Their analysis supports the hypothesis that design and construction
improves project team integration [29]. One advantage that design and construction
variants offer, was found to be better cooperation and communication between the
design and construction teams. Because design and construction contractors are
primarily builders they have constructability input that can be of significant value, in
much the same way that CM consultants can offer this advantage.
Research in Northern Ireland (where design and construction accounts for
approximately 30% of construction work) involving 30 client organisations and 30 of
the major contractors revealed some interesting cautionary insights into design and
construction.
· Competitive tendering is often based on minimal design work or site
investigation, but with estimates inflated to cover consequent risks.
· Life-cycle costing receives limited consideration by contractors in pricing,
particularly with poor client briefs.
· The quality of design and construction is related to the adequacy of the
client brief and the professionalism of the project team. This
professionalism can be strongly challenged by commercial pressures
and poor communication.
· Clients are often ill-informed about the implications of the design and
build approach, and about the importance of a comprehensive brief for
the designer and contractor [30 , p221].
Novation has been developed from the design and construction concept. In
design and construction D+C responsibility for both design and construction is
undertaken by one legal entity responsible for project execution. In tendering for
this option design consultants are generally contracted to develop design concept
or concept advanced (in terms of design developed) project solutions to enable
design and construction tenderers to bid for the project. The design solutions,
though substantially complete (perhaps up to 25%) at the point of novation, are
usually modified to suit constructability issues or for commercial reasons while
maintaining design intent and integrity. This can pose serious problems for clients
who have a more advanced design concept in mind than might be the case for
the design and construction option. In these cases the client may commission a
design solution to be outlined and partially developed which will form the basis for
the project design solution but be open in terms of systems or more specific
detailed design information. Thus, the cost of design development at the
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conceptual and preliminary design stage is already prepared and will not form
part of any further fee structure. The means to meet the spirit and essential
content of the design solution can be addressed by the entity that successfully
takes over a design and construction role to novate the design and take the CM
role in realising the project. This can represent a useful option, which enables
clients to influence the project design to a greater extent than is possible in the
standard D+C option.
The client's risk can be reduced as the contractor takes over design development
after novation but accepts pre-novation design assumptions. This arrangement
allows the contractor to substantially fine-tune the design to take account of its
competitive advantage including constructability issues. For example in the
A$200 million + Australian Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) Great Southern
Stand project, the structural design was changed from cast-in-place to precast
concrete in response to an overheated cast-in-place concrete market and
advantages inherent in an off-site fabrication structural design solution.
Additionally, novation allows fast-tracking and a fixed price, however the client
forgoes some flexibility of making design changes without incurring potential cost
penalties.
The contractor, by embracing the pre-novation design, cannot claim against
design omissions or errors thus accepting contractual risk of the design. The
design team, who frequently risk being simply 'passed' onto the contractor may
see their 'baby' amended to a level felt unacceptable by them. For some design
professionals this may pose important issues of design integrity and ownership
that may be difficult to accept. The system has had numerous successes, the
Adelaide Entertainment Centre was another Australian project that successfully
used a novated design approach [31]. In discussing the likely reason for this
success the following is offered [32]:
· the brief being comprehensive;
· construction proceeding prior to completion of the design documentation;
· builders invited to bid having experience in this type of work;
· the building industry in Adelaide at that time being relatively busy and unlikely
to 'buy' projects; and
· the project having some unusual or special features where building delivery
innovation would provide a cost benefit.
The following comments about using novation are also provided [32] :
· For a limited marketplace with insufficient companies who do not have a
proven record of both designing and constructing - perceived risk of taking
over a design deters many would be tenderers.
· By accepting a novated design companies accept errors and omissions and
other potential problems including a design that may potentially prove
unworkable.
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· The client's right to nominate subcontractors or suppliers is removed under
novation, thus the company taking over both design and construction is free
to make its own contractual arrangements as it sees fit.
· The architect will no longer supervise quality control or exercise sanction once
novation occurs. This is difficult for many designers, as their reputation is
closely associated with their work, which may be modified in a way that could
upset them.
· The client severs direct communication links with the design team once
novation occurs.
· Once novation occurs, the contractor pays the design team. This may pose a
financial risk to the design team if they believe that the contractor is not
financially sound.
In a survey of 54 Hong Kong architecture firms and 30 building contractors
opinions were sought on attitudes towards variants of design and construction.
Three categories are illustrated in Table 2-1 that provide a useful typology
indicating how novation has evolved.
Table 2-1 Extent of Contractor Responsibility for Design in D+C Forms
(Source: Mo [33])
Type of D+C Description
1 Traditional Contractor responsible for complete design and construction
2 Enhanced Contractor responsible for design development, working details and
construction
3 Novated Contractor responsible for design development, working details and
construction with the assignment of the design consultants from the client.
Generally, novation is seen as a D+C variant. The client commissions a design
team to undertake a partially complete design instead of each design and
construction company separately developing a design to a proposal stage. Upon
successful negotiation of the construction contract, the design team and its
design is passed to the successful bidder. The difference between novation and
D+C is principally one of client control and influence. The client has more
influence and control to shape the desired outcome in novation than with D+C.   
Turnkey procurement systems provide for the company supplying D+C services to
also finance the project. The client makes staged or periodic payments towards the
value of work completed for PM, CM, and D+C work. In turnkey projects, however,
the company is generally paid upon completion of the commissioning and testing.
Literally, the client pays for the project and gets the key to gain access to the
project.  While this shares some similarities with 'BOT family' projects the contractor
does not undertake to operate the constructed facility. The turnkey approach suits
many clients who wish, for tax or other financial purposes, to only make a payment
upon delivery of an acceptable product.
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2.4.  Construction Management (CM) and Project Management (PM) and
PM/CM
Non-traditional procurement methods allow for early contractor involvement in the
design development process. This has the benefit of allowing contractor expertise
to be made readily available to the design team. This buildability or constructability
advice is crucial to the development of design solutions that maintain value in terms
of the quality of product as well as providing elegant solutions to production
problems [20, 34]. One non-traditional procurement method proved popular over
the past two decades is Construction Management (CM). The term 'management
contracting' used in the UK is synonymous with the term CM used in Australia or
the USA [35]. Under the CM method the contractor acts as consultant builder
providing significant advice on the practicality of the design and expected
construction methods to be employed. The CM will also provide services such as
construction planning, cost control and coordination and supervision of those who
have direct contracts with the owner to carry out operational work. CM teams often
undertake the management of the construction process for a fee. Trade or work
package specialists physically undertaking the work under separate contracts with
the client which are coordinated, supervised and managed by the CM team.  An
alternative within this option allows for the CM team to take responsibility for the
construction works as head contractor. Either way, the CM team provides design
development advice and supervises and manages the construction process.
There are two forms of CM that can be adopted, agency and direct. Agency CM
applies where the CM undertakes the work as a consultant for a fee providing
constructability advice and coordination of the construction works. A number of
large USA construction management firms operate on this basis. A second form is
Direct CM where the CM undertakes work for a guaranteed maximum fee or
negotiated price, usually when the design is sufficiently advanced to adequately
address issues of risk. Sidwell and Ireland suggest this is generally at a 50-90%
design completion stage [35].
Advantages of using the CM approach are:
· reduced confrontation between the design teams and the team responsible for
supervising construction;
· early involvement of construction management expertise;
· overlap of design and construction;
· increased competition for construction work on large projects due to work
packaging and splitting the construction activities into more digestible 'chunks';
· more even development of documentation;
· fewer contract variations;
· no need for nominated trade contractors; and
· public accountability.
This approach lies between the fixed or tendered price and variable price ends of
the project cost risk spectrum. This form also introduces possibility for addressing
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relationship issues stemming from unequal influence to promote improvements,
especially in design. Under the traditional procurement arrangement the work is
designed then tendered then constructed thus the design team has an established
relationship with the client and dominates the design development phase. In the
CM, PM or PM/CM arrangement, the design team and CM team share design
development input (often with the client or client representative). This results in a
more balanced power and influence relationship developing between these parties
as they jointly solve problems, recognising each others capacity and willingness to
contribute ideas.
Several decades ago, an emerging form of project management (PM) structure was
identified that arose out the move towards multidisciplinary design practices and in-
house project teams undertaking government projects during the late 1960's and
early 1970's. The traditional client representative, generally an architect, was the
lead design team member. The client representative's major role was to coordinate
design activities and oversee construction operations as a non-executive project
manager [28]. This position has become more complex with variations in
responsibility accepted and remuneration varying from a fee for non-executive PM
services to a guaranteed fixed price with contractual relationships between PM and
contractor teams [36]. Responsibility varies from being an 'advisor' to 'executor'.
The PM team generally takes responsibility for design coordination and supervision
of those responsible for undertaking the work packages. If these responsibilities are
not supported by a contractual arrangement, or where the PM team advises a client
willing to take a more active management role, the PM will use a power base of
persuasion and expert knowledge to influence others. In such cases major
decisions are directly presented for formal approval to the client, if an executive, or
addressed to a board if they are charged to represent a client's interests. The PM
team has a contractual arms-length relationship with both the design teams and the
construction team in 'pure' PM arrangements. If the 'advisor' role is adopted, then
the PM managerial influence will take the form of persuasion rather than
authoritative direction.
2.5.  Sequential Negotiated Work Packages - On-Call Contracting
The idea of agreeing general principles, terms and conditions of reward systems
for contacted services then refining agreements for specific work tasks is not
new. In a sense this is very much like the arrangements that prevail with much of
maintenance contracting where skilled workers are contracted for on-call
services. Similarly, medical practitioners have been reported to contract their
services on an on-call basis [37].
On-call contracting is a procurement strategy where the owner initially signs a
master contract with one consultant for a project then divides the project work
into task orders (TOs) that are released to the consultant in phases [38]. It is
based on the premise that the owner or client representative knows the nature of
the work better than the consultant does at the start of a project but the
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consultant knows more at the execution stage and should assume more cost risk
at that time. It is different from the cost plus  (reimbursable) or guaranteed
maximum price (GMP) concept. The advantages are said to include the capacity
within an uncertain project environment to freeze design of work packages into
discrete TOs. Table 2-2 illustrates some on-call operating characteristics.
Table 2-2 Typical On-Call Contracting Characteristics of Design Projects
(Source: from Shing-Tao & Ibbs [38] p 36)
Characteristic Master Contract Task Order (TO)
Planning mode Pre-project planning TO planning
Requirements covered General requirements Specific requirements
Contract analogy Single prime contract Multiple contracts
Payment method Reimbursable Fixed Price (recommended)
Cost risk Risk mainly with the owner Risk mainly with the consultant
This approach enables the TO work to be sufficiently defined, planned for and
budgeted to control the work packages as if they were mini-contracts. However,
because much of the base negotiations regarding work rates and other
conditions have been agreed in the master contract the TOs are easily
accommodated. If the contractor is unavailable or cannot meet the schedule
required, a second contractor can be given the opportunity to negotiate that TO.
This option has attractive features where the client is the best entity to control
project risk and control project scope but the contractor's detailed operational
knowledge is available and can be used to fix costs at an agreed sum. In many
ways this is similar to fast-tracking, though the number of TOs would be generally
greater in number than work packages in a fast-tracking approach.
A fast-track approach entails overlap of detailed design development from more
generalised design development to allow separate work packages to be tendered
while construction proceeds. In theory this offers advantages of project delivery
speed because construction work can proceed on some work packages
(foundation work for example) while design development continues on later
stages of the project (services or finishes for example) [35, 39, 40]. This
approach has been criticised for leading to both time and cost blowouts. For
example, in a study of 150 projects in Alberta Canada, it was found that the start of
construction on many fast-track projects could have been delayed by up to six
months on projects that would still have finished ahead of the date actually
completed [39]. Others have identified potential problems with fast-tracking
including greater propensity for errors and omissions, making communication and
coordination difficult that results in potential for much re-work and time delays
[40]. The issue of poor communication, confusion and re-work, however, has
cast-fast tracking in a poor light. While a fast tracking approach can easily lead to
this situation, good design management practice overcomes these problems
releasing the underlying advantages of overlapping design and construction.
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On-call contracting with the detailed planning and design involved in the
establishment of Tos, can enforce, or at least relies upon, good design
management and implementation planning. On-call contracting differs from a
fast-track approach in detail. The overall work is pre-planned in general and
detailed work packages planned in detail once the specific requirements are
known for both approaches. However, with on-call contracting these work
packages are smaller in scope, more numerous and planned more fully and in
detail. This obviates some of the criticism of fast tracking. Fast-tracking requires
much of the detailed planning to be left to contractors to deal with after each
contract package is awarded but detailed planning is a part of the negotiation
process with on-call contracting [38].
One drawback of on-call contracting is that it is highly planning intensive with
added administrative expenses, however, greater detailed planning effectiveness
has been shown to significantly contribute to construction time performance [41].
Bonus incentive schemes can be successfully used to reward satisfactory
performance on milestones [42]. This has been suggested to be effective when
linked to TOs as a reward for the planning contribution made in developing the
detail of each TO.  Interesting observations about on-call contracting include:
· A hybrid of single and multiple contracts will retain advantages and avoid or
minimise disadvantages of traditional procurement strategies.
· TO planning supplements incomplete pre-project planning by continuing the
scope definition during the design.
· On-call contracting can use the reimbursable method for the master contract
and fixed price for the task orders, which breaks the rule of thumb of adopting
reimbursable contracts for complex projects.
· the TO approach is expensive in terms of administration and planning effort
but this generally reaps compensating rewards in facilitating improved results
from better project coordination, communication and planning [38].
2.6.  Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP)
In the GMP arrangement, the client accepts a share of the cost risk. The client
will agree to reimburse the consultant or contractor only up to a negotiated
guaranteed maximum amount. After that, the consultant or contractor bears the
risk [43]. This method provides the knowledge and expertise of the client to
influence the budget making process to provide a reimbursable amount for the
work but potential mismanagement on the part of the contractor is guarded
against through a guaranteed maximum limit. The contractor either accepts any
expenditure over that amount or another suitable arrangement is negotiated.
The GMP arrangement seems to be gaining popularity in the USA when used in
conjunction with a D+C approach. The arrangement is described as follows:
"On a GMP project, the contractor bases its bid on partially-completed
documents and, extrapolating from them, warrants to the Owner that the price will
not exceed a certain sum. The work is then paid for at the contractor's actual cost
plus a fee, until the GMP is reached. After that, the contractor absorbs additional
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costs. If the actual cost is less than the GMP the Owner keeps the savings (or
sometimes a portion of them with the contractor as an incentive)" - [44 , p420 ].
This procurement approach shares similarities with D+C and novation in that the
client develops a design concept and has the design partially developed by the
client's design team. Unlike novation, the contractor may or may not decide to
take over the design team and its initial design concept. In this regard it shares
similarities with D+C. The major difference with the GMP approach, as opposed to
other procurement systems, is that in GMP the design is fixed, as is the negotiated
price limit, but with open-book reimbursement from the owner/client. The client
takes most of the risk by guaranteeing the cost reimbursement, however, the
contractor also bears the risk of a cost over-run and is, therefore, deterred from
acting in a way that is extravagant or wasteful.
2.7.  Full Cost Reimbursable Procurement
There are occasions when a client wants or needs to maintain total control over
the design result and the construction process. This may be for security reasons,
because the design solution is highly complex (thus contractor risk is prohibitive),
or because of the client's rapidly changing requirements. In such cases, one
option available to the client is to provide an in-house D+C facility but this may
not be feasible. It takes more than capital to establish a contracting and/or design
organisation it requires high levels of expertise and organisational knowledge.
Thus, a client can in effect 'rent' such skills and capacity through contracting to
pay a firm all the costs of production plus an agreed fee for providing the
expertise to advise on production techniques and coordinate implementation—on
a full cost recovery basis. This option provides for a contractor to be chosen to
undertake the work on a cost reimbursable basis with an agreed allowance for
profit and overhead [45]. The project cost, scope and other performance aspects
can be shaped during the design and development phase. This option is suitable
to highly uncertain or risky projects where design details are unknown at the time
of tender, other aspects of the external environment are subject to great change,
or the client prefers to maintain the right to be able to discharge the contractor
during the construction phase. This is suitable for experimental projects where
novel problems may be encountered. The client is essentially paying a fee for the
contractor's expertise and knowledge and using the contractor's organisation as if
it were its own by paying for work through the open book method.
The disadvantages of this approach is that the client takes all risk for the final
cost and must therefore have very high confidence in both the contractor and
design team and also have appropriate auditing systems to ensure that the
facility being constructed represents value for money. An open-book approach
potentially invites exploitation. This approach requires high levels of compliance,
supervision and independent monitoring. These costs have to be considered
when choosing this procurement option. This alternative requires the highest
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level of trust and confidence in the contractor of any procurement option
discussed thus far.
2.8.  Discussion - Procurement Choice as Design Influence Exerted
Some researchers argue that procurement form is largely irrelevant and that the
real issue is how the procurement option enhances or inhibits team members to
maximise their constructive input to achieve project goals [46-48]. While the
traditional approach will be argued to generally inhibit positive interaction, there
are many factors that impact upon performance of non-traditional procurement
choices.
Figure 2-2 illustrates this concept of examining the procurement continuum
through the lens of client influence over the design process.
Client and
independent
design team
influence
over design
Low
High • Cost Reimbursable
• Traditional
• Agency Project Management
• Agency Construction Management
• On-call Contracting
• GMP
• Novation
• Commercial Project Management
• Commercial Project/Construction Management 
• BOOT Types
• Design and Construction
Figure 2-2 Client Influence over Design and Procurement Type
At one extreme the client may trust the design influence being exercised by the
contractor more than that exercised by an independent design team under the
direction of the client. At the other extreme the client may wish to retain influence
and control over the project's aesthetics and functionality.
If clients have high levels of confidence in their own expertise to effectively exert
this influence they will tend to exercise direct authority over an independent
design team. If they have low levels of confidence in their own expertise they
may devolve this authority to a client representative or allow the independent
design team high levels of autonomy. At the high end of the influence spectrum, a
traditional procurement method choice rests on trust that the 'lowest tendered
price' will deliver the least expensive functionally acceptable alternative design.
This choice represents trust in market efficiency/effectiveness, and design team
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efficiency/competence with high client or client representative influence. At the
low end of this spectrum, the client or client representative choice for D+C
procurement or BOOT type forms indicates that the contractor should exert
greater influence on the design solutions. In accepting BOOT type projects, the
client trusts that the market provides a better total project delivery and
operational solution than the client could develop.
Figure 2-3 summarises issues of power and influence as well as design flexibility
associated with procurement forms. Competition on cost, contractor selection
method and who supervises the construction influences the contractor/client risk
acceptance arrangements. Client flexibility to influence design is presented in
terms of design overlap, team member responsibility for design and whether
buildability advice is available.
Risk Notes: 1 no inflation adjustment;         2 with inflation adjustment;   3 no GMP provided;  4 GMP provided
                    5 TO consultant/contract risk    6 Client’s representative/PM
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Figure 2-3 Summary of Differences between Procurement Options
(Source: Adapted from Ireland [45, p188] )
Clearly, procurement choice is a complex issue involving not only technical and
legal aspects but also considerations of power, influence, risk acceptance and
desired design flexibility. Partnering and alliancing  may be chosen independent
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of any chosen procurement path. However, partnering and alliancing is extremely
difficult when applied to a traditional procurement approach. This is because it
generally establishes the groundwork for an adversarial environment and
restricted influence between design and construction teams.
2.9.  Chapter Summary
Before clients commit themselves to deciding upon entering partnerships or
alliances they will need to first review their capacity to become involved as
project partners in realising their project. We saw in Figure 2-1 that there is a
continuum of risk acceptance between the contractor and clients that favours a
particular procurement form. Aside from the extreme where the contractor or the
owner takes all the risk, there is much flexibility of choice in the procurement
approach for the owner/client.
We also saw in Figures 2-2 and 2-3 how the client or owner may actively choose
to participate in the procurement process by exercising influence over other
teams. Naturally their capacity to do so is limited by their capacity to contribute
positively to the decision-making processes that is required throughout the
project realisation phases. Interaction and participation in various phases of the
project delivery process by the client, design and construction teams as a
cohesive group has a direct influence on the quality of their relationship.
The choice of procurement form reflects the client's capacity, desire, or
confidence in establishing a framework where decision-making and initiative is
distributed amongst these three identified groups. The choice of procurement
outcome is a demonstration of trust in gaining sufficient design flexibility to
achieve delivery of the desired project outcome for the client. More specifically a:
· trust in the market to deliver the 'best procurement solution',
· trust in the design team's capabilities for design; and
· the client's own trust assessment of the level of its internal expertise to
constructively add value to the design process.
We will see in the next chapter how trust, commitment, organisational design,
and management style affects relationships in which teams are required to work
closely together to pursue shared goals . This will establish a sound
understanding of how partnering and alliancing is grounded in relationship
building and maintenance between individuals and teams.
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CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPING CROSS-TEAM RELATIONSHIPS
Choices of procurement method were presented in the second chapter. It was
noted that other than when using the traditional procurement method, the
adopted choice should not affect the capacity of a relationship based strategy
(partnering or alliancing) to achieve the project goals through collaborative and
cooperative teamwork. In this chapter we present the essential features of
partnering or alliancing and explore how it may be successfully applied.
Partnering
Mutual
Objectives
Continuous
Improvement
Problem
Resolution
Mutual Objectives - Objectives that firmly
establishes for everyone that their interests are best
served by concentrating on the overall success of
the project
Problem Resolution - Resolve problems with
an escalation strategy to solve them at the lowest
organisational level possible
Continuous Improvement - Performance is
measured and analysed to provide knowledge about
how improvement can be achieved continuously.
There must be a commitment to learn from
experience and to apply this knowledge to improve
performance
Figure 3-1 Three Essential Features of Partnering (Source: adapted from Bennett
and Jayes [49, Chapter 1 page 5])
Figure 3-1 illustrates the foundation for partnering that is consistent with project
alliancing. It is based essentially upon team spirit. The interesting aspect of this
simple model is that all three essential elements require trust, commitment,
honesty, integrity and good communication skills and technologies between
parties. This reinforces the points initially made in the Introduction to this book.
The first feature, mutual objectives, naturally leads to discussion on trust and
commitment. The second feature, problem resolution, leads to discussion of trust
and commitment—given the expectation that problem resolution will be
undertaken in a non-adversarial manner. It also leads to issues of the application
of power and nature of management style and leadership. The latter of these
three essential features, continuous improvement, is linked to the way in which
organisations learn. It also leads to issues of trust and commitment because it
involves teams and individuals feeling safe in measuring performance to learn
from their experience. This requires openness and honesty rather than recording
idealised or false performance records in order to hide mistakes or to attempt to
extract unwarranted credit.
Partnering and alliancing to a similar extent is founded upon team spirit and the
honesty associated with notions of trust, commitment, and the application of
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power and influence. Excellent and effective communication is essential for
successful relationship building.
3.1.  The Role of Power and Influence - Building Mutual Objectives
Procurement arrangements were summarised and illustrated in Figure 2-2 in
terms of client influence over design and procurement. At the high end of the
scale, the client or client representative has the major input and influence upon
the working relationship. Clearly, the contractor takes the majority of cost risk in
the traditional and cost reimbursable procurement approaches. Also in these
approaches, the contractor cannot make design decisions nor has substantial
power to effect or affect design decisions. These remain the prerogative of the
client and/or client representative. On the other hand in BOOT-type projects and
design and construction, it is the contractor who holds most influence over design
detail and even the design strategy. It is true that the client would have established
a design and functional brief that in large part determines the overall outcome, but
the contractor has the power to shape this form. For example, cladding type for a
building may remain open subject to performance measures and the frame type
may be steel, cast-in-place concrete, prefabricated or a hybrid system. This power
dimension can also shape the nature of the working relationship between teams
and determine how conflicting opinions about the relative merits of design solutions
are tolerated and treated. Conflict and diversity are linked to power distance, which
has been shown to be linked to culture [50].
Raggins defines power as "the influence of one person over others, stemming from
an individual characteristic, an interpersonal relationship, a person's position in an
organisation, or membership of a societal group". She points out that groups with
power are interested in maintaining their influence and resources, and may do so
by supporting policies, practices, and prescription that exclude other groups from
power. She also argues that society and those in the organisation with power
substantially shape power relationships among groups in organisations [51, p96].
In some national cultures that are collectivist in nature, there are strong distinctions
between members of in-groups and out-groups [50]. Powerful individuals are in a
position to shape culture through influencing values, assumptions and ideologies.
Building shared mutual goals is a leadership exercise using power and influence
constructively to convince others that they share project objectives that coincides
with their own individual interests. Leadership under these conditions requires
considerable energy and intellectual pursuit of argument to build consensus and
align interests with those of project outcomes. The implication of this view is that the
organisations leaders' mindset can determine, to a large extent, the nature of power
behaviours exhibited in teams, projects or within an organisation. Thus choice of
procurement arrangement will not necessarily guarantee good or poor cross-team
relationships. In undertaking an investigation into team relationships stemming from
alternative procurement systems it would be of value to observe how power is used
and how it affects the project organisational culture(s).
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Power, has also been defined as an agent's (person wielding power) capacity to
influence a target's (person subject to this power) attitude and behaviour.
Authority is concerned with perceptions about the prerogatives, obligations and
responsibilities associated with particular positions in the organisation. Influence
is restricted by the target’s willingness to do what is asked, if this conflicts with
the target’s moral code then the target will not accept the agent’s right to
compliance [52]. The way in which authority affects behaviour is important in an
organisation as it impacts upon the effectiveness of this action. Commitment
results when the target has absorbed and accepted suggestions of the agent. If
this acceptance is grudgingly given or is not wholly accepted then the result will
be compliance. If the agent disagrees with the agent then overt/covert resistance
will follow.  Yukle describes three levels of reaction to authority.
· Instrumental compliance: the target is willing to do whatever the agent
requests, but only for reward. Power used by the agent is fear/punishment
or reward. If the agent looses power to reward or the value of the reward
ceases to be attractive compliance will cease.
· Internalisation: the target becomes committed to support the agent’s
proposals aligning goals/vision accordingly. Commitment is independent of
rewards offered as values and beliefs are the driving forces.
· Identification: target complies to curry favour of agent. Relationship and
affiliation motivate this behaviour. If the agent becomes less attractive then
commitment is withdrawn [52].
The implications of these reactions are highly pertinent to procurement strategies
and team relationships. But what is the nature and derivation of power? Yukle
defines three source groups of power and describes their characteristics [52].
Position power derived from statutory or organisational authority:
· Formal authority
· Control over rewards
· Control over punishments
· Control over information
· Ecological (physical/social environment, technology and organisation)
control.
Personal power derived from human relationship influences or traits:
· Expertise
· Friendship/loyalty
· Charisma.
Political power derived from formally vested or conveniently transient
concurrence of objective and means to achieve these:
· Control over decision processes
· Coalitions
· Co-option
· Institutionalisation.
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These are raw forces to be used or abused and can be manipulated in procuring
construction facilities. The way in which they are deployed explains the dangers
of brainwashing, the reality-rhetoric gap and the failure to maintain a consistent
and empowering attitude to deal with talented knowledge workers with much to
offer [53-55].
The following outlines seven forms of power [56 , p178]:
1. Coercive - based on fear. Failure to comply results in punishment
(position power);
2. Connection - based on ‘connections’ to networks or people with influential
or important persons inside or outside organisations (personal + political
power);
3. Reward - based on ability to provide rewards through incentives to
comply. Is expected that suggestions be followed (position power);
4. Legitimate - based on organisational or hierarchical position (position +
political power);
5. Referent - based on personality traits such as being likeable, admired etc
thus able to influence (personal power);   
6. Information - based on possession to or access to information perceived
as valuable (position, personal + political power);
7. Expert - based on expertise, skill and knowledge which through respect
influences others (personal power).
The nature of power and influence, the sources of this power and the way in
which it is used to contribute to or manipulate cooperative relationships underpin
all procurement strategies and the relationships that develop from these. It is
interesting that a number of books have appeared providing advice on the use of
power to undermine the competitor and to win against a perceived enemy. The
most famous of these have been written by Machiavelli and Sun-Tzu.  A recent
book on power and its use—which features ideas from the Machiavelli, Sun-Tzu
and others—relate to winning power and holding power for personal gain and not
to achieve a goal that is shared by others [56]. Positional power, however, is the
lease effective of the three outlined in building commitment to shared objectives,
win-win outcomes and constructive dialogue whether in resolving differences or
building shared understanding.
Hersey and Blanchard [57 , p178] argue that application of coercive power for
alliancing and partnering should provide only a backstop and dispute resolution
systems should be designed to inhibit or minimise the exercise of this form of
power. Connective power should be used insofar that it becomes a natural
outcome of achievement of project objectives. Reward and incentive needs to be
structured to form support mechanism for commitment and shared effort and not
merely as principal objectives to be striven for. Legitimate power should flow from
sound organisational design and serve to clarify and ensure goal achievement.
Referent and information/expert power are the two power sources most
Chapter 3 - Developing Cross-Team Relationships
_________________________________________________________________
Page 30
applicable to best promote a leadership style that facilitates success of expert
teams working together to achieve mutual and shared goals.
As the 5 to 7 power forms above are recognised as being most effective in
building relationship with highly skilled knowledge workers it is worth considering
the development and management of those power bases in more detail. Tables
3-1 and 3-2 provide a useful summary for this purpose.
Table 3-1 Increasing and Maintaining Power for Referent Power
(Source: Yukle [52] )
How to Increase + Maintain Power How to Use Power Effectively
· Show acceptance and positive regard Use personal appeal when necessary
· Act supportive and helpful Indicate that a request is important to you
· Don't manipulate and exploit people for
personal advantage
Don't ask for a personal favour that is
excessive, given the relationship
· Defend someone's interest and back them
up when appropriate
· Keep promises
· Make self-sacrifices to show concern
· Use sincere form of ingratiating the target
Provide an example of proper behaviour (role
model)
Table 3-2 Increasing and Maintaining Power for Information/Expert Power
(Source: Yukle [52] )
How to Increase + Maintain Power How to Use Power Effectively
· Gain more relevant knowledge
· Keep informed about technical matters
· Develop exclusive sources of information
· Explain the reason for a request or proposal
· Explain why a request is important
· Use symbols to verify expertise
· Demonstrate competence by solving difficult
problems
· Provide evidence that a proposal will be
successful
· Don't make rash and careless statements
· Don't lie or misrepresent the facts
· Listen seriously to target's concerns
· Show respect for the target (don't be
arrogant)
· Don't keep changing positions · Act confident and decisive in a crisis
These indicate the manner in which power sources are used (or can be abused)
and this helps to explain how a human relationship factor such as trust is affected
by the power relationship. It can now be appreciated that causes of claims and
disputes can be explained as being associated with relationship issues. Disputes
often stem from individuals resisting an inappropriate (in their perception) use of
influence by team leaders using one or more of the power types outlined above.
Indeed many of project failure causes relating to communication failures can be
viewed in this light as inappropriate power application responses [58, 59].
Withholding, delaying or obstructing information flow are examples of either an
overt or covert act of resistance to information being demanded or expected.
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Delay/inertia is a useful, and often powerful, response adopted by those coerced
to deliver perceived unfair demands from those applying positional power.
The whole issue of power use and communication has been explored by a
number of management thinkers interested in the management of projects. One
such view expressed is the scope in terms of positional interrelationship between
team members, their peers, those they report to and those reporting to them [60].
Figure 3-2 illustrates a project manager and important interrelationship of
influence and negotiation that takes place at the interface of power use,
communication and commitment to agreed action.
Project Board/Sponsor
Influence over and subject to the project
board/sponsor - resource issues,
progress towards objectives
Project Team
Influence over  resource
application, leading
progress towards objectives
Self
Influence over the way and
style of leadership to influence
progress towards objectives
Peers
Influence over negotiating
scarce resources + influencing
progress towards objectives
Project 
Manager
Figure 3-2 The Project Manager and 360° Influence Mapping
(Source: Adapted from Lovell [60, p74] )
A project manager has several options available when trying to assert influence.
These include presenting ideas in a rational and clearly communicated manner,
challenging alternative ideas, and threatening to actually withholding crucial
information. Likewise, other team members can apply the same tactics when
dealing with the project manager. Thus communication and power/influence are
closely linked.
Willingness to comply with authority and to assert authority forms a matrix of
likely reaction quadrants [60].
1) When acceptance of authority and assertiveness is high, active consensus
takes place in a mature and productive manner.
2) When acceptance of authority is high but assertiveness is low, passive loyalty
results. In such cases, project goals may appear to be mutually arrived at but
are not. This can result in project goals being half-heartedly supported.
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3) When acceptance of authority is low but assertiveness is high, covert
resistance results. As in case 2 above, project goals  may appear to be
mutually arrived at but in reality, are not. In this situation, project goals may be
covertly rejected and secretly undermined.
4) When acceptance of authority and assertiveness is low, peer rivalry takes
place in an immature and unproductive manner. Project goals may be actively
sabotaged as each party attempts to win at the expense of others or if not
totally rejected then passively compromised through inertia.
This helps to explain the symptoms of what may be termed as 'team' or 'non-
team' playing, 'playing the system', or 'playing political games' in which authority
is subverted through the system of governance and organisational style. These
sorts of power reactions take place at all levels, which may account for varying
quality of relationships between teams from different firms who jointly contribute
to the realisation of projects. The above also helps us understand the underlying
mechanisms taking place during negotiations and mutual adjustment when
making agreements and commitments. This is particularly true when establishing
the relative importance of issues to negotiating parties, appreciating the needs
and pressures of others and establishing and maintaining trust. The two
dimensions under scrutiny are the degree to which each team attempts to satisfy
its own concerns and the attempt to satisfy the other party's concerns.
Useful categorisation of peers can be based upon degree of trust and agreement
with high trust/low agreement leading to opponents and low trust/low agreement
leading to adversaries. The significance of this to partnering issues such as
continuous improvement and problem resolution is that opponents can make a
positive contribution through effective argument and casting perceived problems
in a number of different lights. This can lead to a better understanding, which
may produce a better decision or outcome with high trust/ high agreement—
representing allies in quadrant 1. Opponents can be constructive whereas
adversaries are generally destructive, as their aim is to thwart the intended
outcome. This is where much of the trust required in relationships breaks down
and where the quality of communication deteriorates.
Lovell  offers useful techniques for persuasion including the use of:
· Assertiveness - using power of logic, facts or opinion;
· Reward/Punishment - using pressure and persuasion to control others;
· Common visioning - identifying a shared or common vision for the outcome;
· Participation and trust - involving others in the decision making and problem-
solving process to gain commitment [60, p76 ].
Additionally, interrelated factors determining appropriate selection of influencing
tactics for a particular influencing attempt require consideration of:
· consistency with prevailing social norms and role expectations about use of
tactic (that is the societal view of power pointed out by Raggins [51]);
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· the influencing agent possessing the appropriate power base for use of the
particular tactic;
· appropriateness for the objective sought;
· level of resistance encountered or anticipated; and
· the cost of using the tactic in terms relation to benefit [52].
Yukle [52] offers tangible help in Table 3.3 providing tactics to gain commitment
from supervisors (UP), colleagues (LATERAL) and those supervised
(DOWN).
Table 3-3 Use of Influencing Tactics. (Source: adapted from Yukle [52, p229] )
Influence
Tactic
Directional Use of
Tactic
Sequencing of
Results
Used Alone or in
Combinations
Likelihood of
Commitment
Rational
persuasion
More UP than
DOWN or
LATERAL
Used more for initial
request
Used frequently
both ways
Moderate
Inspirational
appeals
More DOWN than
UP or LATERAL
No difference Used most with
other tactics
High
Consultation More DOWN and
LATERAL than UP
No difference Used most with
other tactics
High
Ingratiation More DOWN and
LATERAL than UP
Used more for initial
request
Used most with
other tactics
Low to
moderate
Personal
appeal
More LATERAL
than DOWN or UP
Used more for initial
request
No difference Low to
moderate
Exchange More DOWN and
LATERAL than UP
Used most for
immediate follow-up
No difference Low to
moderate
Coalition
tactic
More LATERAL
and UP than
DOWN
Used most for
delayed follow-up
No difference Low
Legitimising
tactic
More DOWN and
LATERAL than UP
Used most for
immediate follow-up
Used most with
other tactics
Low
Pressure More DOWN and
LATERAL than UP
Used most for
delayed follow-up
No difference Low
These tactics are listed as follows:
1. Rational persuasion - the agent uses logical argument and factual evidence;
2. Inspirational appeals - the agent attempts to arouse target’s enthusiasm by
appealing to target’s value system or by increasing target’s self-confidence;
3. Consultation - the agent seeks target participation in planning strategy or
change or to modify an existing proposal;
4. Ingratiation - the agent uses praise, flattery, friendly or helpful behaviour;
5. Personal appeals - the agent appeals to target’s feelings of loyalty/friendship;
6. Exchange - the agent offers an exchange of favours, indicates willingness to
reciprocate, promises gainsharing;
7. Coalition tactics - the agent seeks the aid of others to persuade the target with
the support of others;
8. Legitimising tactics - the agent claims authority or right for target support; and
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9. Pressure - the agent uses demands, threats, frequent checking or making
persistent remainders.
These important issues of power and influence have lead management analysts
to consider the concept and impact of empowerment. This is recognition of the
indispensable nature of the employee and the potential contribution that he/she
can make.  Empowerment has been defined as the "vesting of decision making
or approval to employees where, traditionally, such authority was managerial
prerogative" [61].  Trust and empowerment are closely and powerfully linked to
effective teamwork. An alternative term that is being used these days for
empowerment is 'enabling' which has a broader meaning for providing resources
to enable people to achieve goals and objectives.
Newcombe draws interesting conclusions for implications of power in the
construction industry. He notes that clients should realise that the criteria used to
select consultants, contractors and the form of contract may be less important
than the approaches to power structures. The fragmentation and friction
engendered under the traditional system often fails to produce the expected
result. Building expert/information power is an important aspect of relationship
interactions for consultants, construction managers and project managers.
Newcombe argues that "If the empowerment approach is adopted then skill in
building networks of contacts such as designers, trade contractors, clients,
suppliers and stakeholders with an interest in a project will be necessary. Sharing
power with other people requires cool nerve and judgement. Working in an
empowered organisation will be very frightening for people used to the traditional
system." [62].
So we see that building team spirit through developing mutually agreed goals and
objectives is a task easier preached than practised. It requires a degree of
leadership and management style  that is rarely found. This is because often
those with the power and authority vested by the client to deliver projects have
limited capacity or willingness to create the required team empowerment, or have
the leadership qualities and psychological awareness to generate the necessary
levels of trust and commitment. Often, project managers or the procurement
method chosen does not allow the creativity and problem-solving ability of highly
skilled teams to flourish. We can get teams together to develop and present a
charter of mutually agreed objectives but it takes trust and commitment as well as
an extraordinary level of group and individual leadership to sustain the rhetoric.
We also need staff (as opposed to managers) who are willing to 'grasp the nettle'.
3.2.  Performance Improvement Through Innovation, Continuous
Improvement and Knowledge Management
Another dimension of essential features of partnering or alliancing  is a
commitment to continuous improvement and organisational learning, that is,
knowledge management and its use to enable innovation. Organisational learning
codifies experience gained by individuals and teams in a form that adds value to an
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organisation.  Learning is an asset, comprising intellectual property, which can be
re-used to add competitive advantage [63]. It is also an effective means by which
innovation can be introduced to organisations. Innovation is often generated from
team members’ personal experiences brought with them from one temporary
organisation, or teams within them, to another [64].
For once-off construction clients the issue of organisational learning may not be of
immediate importance—except in an indirect way that general learning should add
to general productivity and subsequent performance improvement. For clients with
a more focussed interest in continuous improvement and benefit gains from lessons
learned, the diffusion of knowledge and organisational learning is a critical issue.
Procurement methods have a direct impact upon the diffusion of organisational
learning. In the study on construction time performance (CTP) commissioned by the
Construction Industry Institute Australia (CIIA) in 1996, it was discovered that only
on the process engineering projects had there been any attempt to formalise
learning from a post project evaluation [65]. The construction industry, both for
general building and civil engineering, seems to view structured harvesting of
lessons learned as being of low priority and indeed an unnecessary expense [64,
65].  This represents a source of waste that should concern all parties in the
construction procurement stream of activities.
Solutions to this particular waste problem have been identified as encouragement
and development of effective innovation and developing a more effective means of
harvesting lessons learned. Lenard argues, from the basis of results of a recent
research project involving 17 case studies [66], that innovation observed from his
case studies is based upon:
· the client's recognition of the need for innovation;
· contractual incentives to encourage innovation;
· creation of a symbiotic learning environment; and
· open communication at all levels.
Newcombe suggests that in the same way that UK safety regulations now require
that construction companies should appoint a Safety Supervisor, that companies
should also appoint a Learning Facilitator. This person would be required to de-brief
project participants to help convert individual tacit knowledge into a learning or
knowledge base that underpins team and organisational learning [67]. This idea
supports the idea proposed by Walker and Lloyd-Walker, that procurement systems
should provide for project debriefing to enable clients and project teams to promote
continuous improvement through creating a similar process to that suggested by
Newcombe [64].
Developing a learning environment focus presents challenges. A continuum of trust
operates with a gradation of individuals', teams' and organisations' belief that their
competitors will not take unfair advantage of lessons learned. From the individual's
trust point of view, this means that they not lose their competitive advantage and be
'used up' and discarded [68]. This is a particularly sensitive issue when developing
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expert systems that routinise and electronically replace experts. From a firm's point
of view, there is an issue of trust when passing on lessons learned, which are
rightly considered a critical competitive asset. From the point of view of a temporary
organisation or team groups spanning several firms on a project, there may be an
issue of trust about opinion-related knowledge regarding performance of individuals
or teams engaged in the project. In a sense the issue of organisational knowledge
and trust may be about competitive advantage and objectivity. It is interesting  to
observe the reactions of companies unfamiliar with knowledge sharing through
entering a partnering/alliancing arrangement and how they respond to clients with a
knowledge management focus. Barlow et al provide some keen insights from a
series of partnering case studies in the UK involving over 40 companies [69]. They
observed some clients viewed a prime reason for partnering as being to improve
innovation and organisational learning as one of their survival techniques—the
motivation for others was to gain competitive advantage. Smaller suppliers and
subcontractors were reported to often perceive participating in many meetings to
discuss options of performing and coordinating their work with others as an
imposition of time, energy and resources. After adapting to this unfamiliar
environment they did feel, however, that they had gained innovative techniques and
new ideas by sharing information which was worthwhile.
Clearly, there needs to be a shift in the construction industry's general culture to
move towards a climate of sharing knowledge to enhance the entire industry's
capacity to take advantage of lessons learned from each project. Partnering and
strategic alliances with their ethos of shared problem solving and open
communication may facilitate this cultural change process. Uher, argues that the
construction industry needs a new breed of proactive leader with vision and
courage to challenge existing dogmas and approaches to managing the project
delivery process [70].
This chapter concerns itself with exploring how cross-team relationships can be
improved. We suggest that this is related to the choice of procurement form
because the traditional approach fails to draw the construction team into the design
process at preliminary and early development stages, thus valuable opportunities
for knowledge sharing, more open relationship building and development of trust
are missed. The literature provides interesting findings comparing the performance
of traditional and non-traditional construction projects. In one research study of 69
projects, the authors concluded that chosen procurement approach may assist in
optimising but not directly influencing project performance [71]. They note that the
traditional procurement approach may be suitable for simple projects but that non-
traditional complicated procurement methods may be better suited where projects
become complex. This may be due to complex construction methods being
required to implement the design brief or that complexity is introduced through the
nature of building services or complicated and/or potentially conflicting client
objectives. Others have argued that non-traditional procurement methods are better
suited for dealing with project uncertainty for complex situations where the client is
represented by a committee, often with competing objectives [72].
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One approach that brings the construction team into potentially closer contact with
the design team is to overlap the design and construction process of the project
through phasing the project. The project is developed as a series of overlapped
design then constructed work packages. This is generally known as fast-tracking. A
number of researchers have identified fast-tracking as a link between construction
time performance and procurement method. This link is, at yet, inconclusive [73-
76]. However, the general consensus supports the view that non-traditional
procurement facilitates greater construction management team involvement which,
if the team responds favourably, increases chances of project success. Traditional
procurement forms, while not excluding potential project success, present barriers
to successful communication and inter-team relationship building as well as
providing inadequate time for sound construction project planning. This project
planning phase when undertaken collaboratively with cross-team contribution
assists individual, team and organisational learning as it exposes participants to
complex problems that need to be solved by viewing options from multiple points of
view. Thus, opportunities for both innovation diffusion and knowledge transfer are
increased. Co-location of design and production teams has also been identified as
a stimulus to learning as there are better opportunities for cross-disciplinary
problem solving as well as more face-to-face interaction and possible socialising
that builds trust and commitment [16, 51, 69, 77, 78].
A series of 64 case studies on construction time performance (CTP) of Australian
construction projects, concluded that traditionally-procured projects are less likely
to achieve as good construction time performance as non-traditionally procured
projects [48]. There were neither novation nor reimbursable projects in the Walker
1997 study however a third of the cases included were construction management,
project management and D+C projects. CTP is just one dimension of project
success but it is closely linked to cost performance and does provide a good
indicator of overall project performance. One interesting finding from the analysis
indicated that the non-traditional procurement method, when compared to
traditional project procurement methods, performed at a 21% better CTP level.
Further evidence provided reasons for this through investigation of data on some
100+ variables measured. It was also concluded, taking into account the literature,
that to achieve good CTP the following progression applies:
· project team members (the client's representative, the design team, the
construction management team) bring with them expertise and knowledge for
potential project success, that is, expertise assets
· these assets create a latent capacity for project success
· when this capacity is effectively activated it results in good team performance
· this performance translates into project success, particularly good construction
time performance.
This model for success, illustrated in Figure 3-3, is likely to be independent of any
particular procurement method, but research has consistently pointed towards non-
traditional procurement as providing an environment where this model can be most
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effectively applied. This research [48] clearly indicated, from a construction time
performance point of view, that there is a close link between team capacities,
their behaviours and project timeliness outcomes. This reinforces the argument
we propose that innovation and knowledge management fosters improved project
performance.
Inter-team
communication
skills
Inter-team
relationship
building skillsSophisticated
construction
management
team planning
skills
Sophisticated
client
representative’s
TEAM ASSETS
Project Team’s Ability to Plan + Deal With Risk
TEAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
planning co-ordination communication TEAM PERFORMANCE
management/organisational style
• Task Focus
• People Focus
• Risk Management
Figure 3-3 A Model for Construction Time Performance  Project Success
(Source: Walker [48] )
While Figure 3-3 indicates how knowledge is managed to achieve the level of team
performance experienced, it does not indicate how different procurement options
influence knowledge transfer. This is because knowledge management is largely
independent of procurement type. The client, for example, could influence
knowledge transfer on a traditional lump project or on design and construction or
any other system. This can be achieved by simply stipulating a knowledge
management and transfer mechanism in the contract conditions. If this were to be
instigated then a small extra price would be paid by the client to ensure that the
general market gains a competitive lift—which, in turn, could lead to lower costs
due to improved industry productivity. Scuderi and Hampson support this idea by
proposing a knowledge management strategy for a public works agency to improve
industry effectiveness.  They suggest enhanced contractor specific relationships
and knowledge sharing from project to project will build a stronger local construction
industry [79].
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In attempting to create a more constructive environment in which trust, flexibility
and openness to sharing ideas and intellectual capital is encouraged, we can
look at the problem and attempt to minimise its impact. In analysing performance
data there may often be conflicting interpretations of patterns and meaning.
Conflict is not of itself bad. Much innovation arises out of conflicting
interpretations of observed phenomena. In fact economist Joseph Shumpeter,
seminar author of innovation and technology literature, refers to much of this
process as creative destruction [80]. Conflict is often the result of different people
having a different perspective on an issue. One person may see things one way
and others may see the same thing quite differently. This is a positive and natural
occurrence. Conflict requires clarification of the variance between the way one
person sees something and the way another does. Senge calls this the process
of dialogue in fact he maintains that this process helps people understand more
clearly issues "in dialogue people become observers of their own thinking" [81,
p242]. This is particularly important when considering plans or discussing
possible impact of actions.
The fact that conflicts arise signifies either that healthy debate is taking place or
negative contradictions are being proposed to protect entrenched (perhaps
poorly thought through) positions. In discussing creative conflict Senge states
that for this to happen:
· all participants must suspend judgement and assumptions (that is respect the
other person's opinion and maintain an open mind that it may be valid),
· all participants to dialogue must consider each other as colleagues (rather
than adversaries); and
· there must be a facilitator to hold the context of dialogue. This may be a
system or workplace culture that allows the dialogue to flow towards better
understanding of consequences hitherto unforeseen and to bring about
creative win-win solutions [81,  p243].
Others agree with this view of conflict as being a positive attribute when used
constructively. One interesting view of what is often called the learning
organisation is the practitioner as inquirer [82, p35]. This concept has
practitioners consciously using self-dialogue and colleagues as sounding boards
to question their understanding of any given situation. They see these as
organisations that use conflict constructively to fully examine paradox and
uncertainty in order to solve complex problems. Many problems leading to poor
decision-making result from errors caused by lack of available information,
misinterpretation, and information being hidden when needed. There are also a
lot of attitudinal issues leading to destructive conflict. If communication problems
and pro-actively shared information could be openly laid on the table for
discussion, without fear of defensive behaviour taking place, then much of what
appears to be unknown could be discovered through constructive conflict.
Conflict can lead to single loop learning (in which rules are applied to modify
behaviour and 'fix' problems) at the superficial level. Hierarchical power systems
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and structures prevalent in 'traditional' procurement systems encourage this. The
rules and behaviours may lead conflict participants towards dispute resolution
through claims.  Possibilities exist to operate outside the rules or at least to use
rules as a guide only in double loop learning (where insights become available
that can lead to navigation around rules to the resolution of problems that make
little sense). Senseless or retrograde rules act as barriers to effective team
relationships. This is not about corruption or avoiding the framework of contracts
and sound regulation or transparency of action. This is about seeing the issues in
the context of a broader system of procuring a satisfactory project outcome within
the project goals  and vision.
Buildability exercises are a good example of double loop learning as is much the
effort associated with quality management leading to continuous improvement. A
particular design solution (the rule) may be resolved through a better and more
workable solution.
This concept is taken further to challenge principles in triple loop learning. An
example of this could be the principle of the building product being challenged
through value analysis and other methodologies that may challenge the basic
need for a feature, design solution or entire facility. Triple loop learning occurs
when barriers are removed to liberate us so that we can explore wider
possibilities that challenge system-wide assumptions, dogma, or deeply held
belief systems. This may lead to invention rather than innovation [83]. Innovation
is generally about incremental improvement whereas invention is about a
breakthrough where a paradigm shift occurs. Thus, conflict of opinion is
inevitable and not a bad thing at all—in fact it indicates strength and not
weakness in an organisation.
Newcombe argues that traditional and D+C procurement systems inhibit double-
loop learning and promote single-loop learning. Significant changes to the design
at tender are rarely challenged through the traditional procurement approach and
the D+C approach frequently leads to standardisation at the expense of
innovative design [67].
The basic thrust of the argument presented thus far has maintained that the
'traditional' procurement system has forced a constraining effect on creativity.
Further, project participants are restrained from sharing information in an open
manner unhindered by fear of being exploited. There appears to be much
confusion about which of the non-traditional procurement systems are most
effective or even under what circumstances they should be adopted to counter
this constraining and restraining tendency. The common thread, however, is that
a different attitude is possible between participants on non-traditional
procurement approaches. This attitude is the key to allowing cross-team learning
to take place and explore other possibilities of meaning from different views of
events.  Love et al explore this possibility for cross-project learning opportunities
[63]. This facilitates innovation and joint problem solving between the design
Chapter 3 - Developing Cross-Team Relationships
_________________________________________________________________
Page 41
team, client representative, construction team and supply chain teams. Attitude
modifies conflict. Aggressive self-defence can result in one conflict outcome from
one attitudinal pattern. Constructive dialogue, on the other hand, can elicit a win-
win solution through negotiation where broader solution sets are entertained.
Current interest in procurement systems that encourage interaction, genuine
information and ideas sharing and joint problem solving is based upon a rejection
of the power paradigm characterised by the 'traditional' procurement approach.
Green points out that the traditional leadership and working approach in the
construction industry essentially follows the machine metaphor of 'the system'
being like a well oiled machine, however, as he correctly observes the
construction industry is a 'people' industry and not a bureaucracy [53]. People in
the construction industry at most levels seem to want to 'get on with the job', the
'can-do' mentality is prevalent and has been shown so in at least one study of 45
projects in Australia which included measuring organisational style and
organisational form [41]. That same 'can-do' attitude was reportedly introduced
from the USA to the Broadgate project in London in the early 1990s [84]. Thus,
the artificial them-and-us mentality is not supported in the industry as a preferred
modus operandi.  Rather it becomes the 'normal' system through default because
the traditional procurement system sets teams (particularly the design and
construction teams) in potential conflict through its win-lose propensity.
The partnership-style paradigm that is promoted by cooperative and collaborative
arrangements is the culture or political metaphor where systems are established
to define vision and goals and to facilitate a shared and supportive milieu in
which these joint goals can be realised. Thus, project teams go forward together
to realise joint aims that satisfies numerous teams' agenda. The project culture or
'way things are done around here' and the political motivation to achieve aims
through joint action is exemplified by the range of partnership and alliance
arrangements that will be discussed in detail later. This attitude is productive but
open to manipulation. Trompenaars reminds us that culture is a socially
constructed reality. While often being unarticulated, it is shared by its members.
This 'reality' is an historically determined phenomenon evidenced by values,
rituals, heroes symbols and practices [85]. Green cautions against what he calls
'brain-washing' in mechanistic organisations. He uses business process
reengineering (BPR) and lean construction as examples of a prevailing machine
metaphor. He sees this as a danger for maintaining a 'command and control'
mentality that is so typical of the 'traditional' procurement system, even when
applied in the alternative procurement forms that seek to engage team spirit [86].
We can see from Green's arguments that positive attitudes to collaborate to
achieve project goals  has a darker side and that this danger should not be
dismissed. He sees cultural engineering as a powerful and potentially dangerous
tool, especially when diversity is discouraged and opportunities for constructive
conflict and debate is lessened.
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In seeking to gain true benefits of diversity the danger of groupthink is ever
present. One of the symptoms of groupthink is cultural homogeneity, where
everyone thinks, acts and reacts in the same way. This has been exemplified as
"All team members must wear the same coloured shirts and play the same game
in much the same way. Differences are either invisible or they are erased by
cloning to the team's culture, putting on the teams' shirt. If we follow the sports
metaphor through, these sorts of teams are set in competitive  relations with other
teams, have exclusive and very clearly bounded memberships, and share their
experiences only in accordance with strictly imposed rules" [87, p176].
For creativity and innovation to flourish, there needs to be a new paradigm of
organisational form that encourages diversity for its advantages of seeing the
same things in so many different ways. It is possible to design questioning
processes to take place as part of a project design and design review process—
using tools such as value analysis, constructability and business process
reengineering [55]. Greater opportunities are exposed and more options are
canvassed in discussing problems and solutions. There is also a better chance of
more fully exploring the consequences of planned actions where greater diversity
exists. It is this theory that helps to explain why the 'traditional' procurement
system has failed society and clients and why alternatives tend to fare better.
3.3.  Problem Resolution - Acting like one Big Team
It is inevitable that different people will see problems in varying ways—that is the
core of diversity. In previous sections in this chapter we have seen that diversity
and challenging current methods lies at the core of innovation and organisational
learning. We also saw that the for trust and commitment to flourish in partnering
or alliance relationships, an appropriate leadership style needs to be chosen that
demonstrates sensitivity in the balance and type of power applied.
Encouraging diversity allows alternative and even radical reappraisal of methods,
techniques, plans and even objectives to be considered. This requires an
organisational structure and form that encourages constructive dialogue to occur.
Teams and individuals must feel not only able to dispute issues but feel
unimpeded in doing so. The aim is not to stifle opinion or debate but to arrive at a
shared resolution of issues to the satisfaction of those involved while maintaining
the momentum of the progress towards achieving project objectives. Two
elements of this dialogue are required to be in place. First, teams and individuals
must feel empowered to speak their mind so that all relevant facts, views and
feeling are properly aired. This releases blockages in understanding and
facilitates true communication, thus a basis for action can be established.
Second, a system must be in place that manages conflicting views and opinions
to facilitate appropriate action. This is necessary because "When problems are
not resolved quickly, peoples' position harden, details get forgotten and further
problems accumulate so that what may have begun as a simple issue grows into
a major dispute" [49, chapter 1 p7]. Problems must be resolved at the lowest
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possible level within an organisation as quickly as possible otherwise unresolved
issues bog down progress.
Loosemore cautions us on the dangers of not balancing power and responsibility
and notes that when problems arise, power struggles tend to develop between
different interest groups (who seek to off-load responsibility for these problems)
[88]. His case study on a traditionally procured project typifies the process of
crisis generation and (mis)management prevalent in an environment where
dispute resolution procedures are poorly developed. Often, threats of using more
formal dispute resolution procedures such as resorting to posturing about legal
rights and claims only entrenches positions of mistrust. Such actions only result
in half-hearted or very low commitment to project goals being accompanied by
high commitment to personal goals. Sometimes threats invite acts of retribution.
Clearly, the most sensible solution to problem resolution is to keep disputes as
'cool' as possible, i.e. take the 'heat' out of the debate. Also, there is a need to
resolve disputes at their source by establishing an escalation procedure where
only those problems that cannot be resolved at one level are passed up the
management authority chain for resolution.
A project partnering/alliancing charter is an agreement between parties to commit
to a series of principles [49]. One important element of this principle is to
establish a mechanism for resolving disputes at the lowest organisational level.
Like risk, the principle is that those individuals with the means to deal with
problems should do so and not pass this responsibility on to others. Often, even
though a risk or problem is not 'fairly' or even 'technically' owned by an individual
or team (entity), it is in everyone's interest that this entity resolve the issue
quickly if it can do so. There is a large element of trust involved in taking this
course of action that the 'swings and roundabouts' effect will ensure that the party
consenting to this action will not be disadvantaged in the longer term. This is all
part of the process of mutual adjustment that takes place in most negotiations. It
may feature in both traditional and non-traditional procurement practices where
good interpersonal relations are present.
Problem and dispute resolution procedures adopted in partnering/alliancing
provide for the types of problem to be defined and reasonable timeframes for
resolution stipulated. The reason for escalating a dispute may be hardening of
diverse positions or may simply be a result of the party not being authorised to
commit required resources to resolve the dispute. In cases where a dispute is
escalated unnecessarily, the person escalating the dispute may well lose face in
doing so. This provides a self-regulating mechanism for ensuring that problems
are indeed resolved at the lowest level possible. It is normal for more than 90% of
problems to be solved at the lowest level [49, chapter 3 page 41]. A flow-chart
model problem resolution is illustrated and explained in Figure 3-4 below. The
advantages of having an agreed dispute resolution procedure in place can be
summarised as follows:
· Problems are solved and disputes resolved quickly;
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· Solutions are generally found amicably through mutual adjustment;
· Trust is generally reinforced;
· Commitment is maintained and strengthened through joint problem solving;
· People generally feel empowered by the experience of resolving problems
using their own discretion and authority;
· It builds self-confidence; and
· It allows diversity of opinion to be legitimised and also legitimises opposing
points of views being accepted.
Identify ProblemI tif  r l
Clarify Problem with Other Partiesl rif  r l  it  t r rti
Determine Level of Decisiont r i  l f i i
Agree to Time Limitr  t  i  i it
Propose Solutionsr  l ti
Problem
Resolved?
r l
l
Agreementr t
Yes
No
Elevate to
Next Level
 Figure 3-4 Problem Resolution Flow Chart
(Source: Bennet & Jayes [49,
Chapter 1 p7] )
Good practice includes:
· Daily meetings of first level
managers involved with the
project;
· Focus attention on solving
problems that have arisen that
day;
· A clearly defined system of
referring problems that can not
be solved to a higher
management level;
· The process should be
designed to find permanent
solutions to problems;
· Explore parties real interest,
avoid entrenched positions;
· The process should focus on
finding answers not attributing
blame;
· Recognise that people make
mistakes but are unlikely to
repeat them;
· Resolve disputes without the
need for legal processes.
Throughout this section of this chapter we have stressed that trust and
commitment underpins the three essential elements of partnering and alliancing
(mutual objectives, problem resolution, and continuous improvement). We have
also shown that balancing power and responsibility is crucial in the development
of trust and commitment especially when such relationships have been formed
out of a dependence upon a party's resources, knowledge or goodwill [89].  So
what exactly do we mean by the terms trust and commitment and how are these
qualities created and maintained?
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3.4.  Trust, Commitment and Relationship Building
Partnering and alliancing  are based upon a need for trust to generate
commitment and constructive dialogue. Trust is part of an outcome from
negotiation. The everyday interrelationship experiences of project team members
are shaped by the way in which they negotiate. This can include communication
exchanges, decisions about activities or plans for design and/or construction and
a host of other issues that contribute to teams acting like partnerships rather than
bands of individuals working on the same project.
The notion of trust is complex. It has many layers of meaning. "Simply put, trust
means confidence - confidence that others' actions are consistent with their
words, that those people with whom you work are concerned about your welfare
and interest apart from what you can do for them…" [90]. At one level, reasoned
expectations will be fulfilled. You can trust that a certain thing will or will not
happen under a given set of conditions. This raises interesting notions of the
difference between scepticism and cynicism and how predictability is related to
past experiences and future expectations based upon that experience. Trust at
its naïve level is almost synonymous with hope. In most relationships, personal
and business, trust is as much about something happening as not happening. If
we do 'the right thing' and we trust people we expect that rewards (either tangible
or intangible) will follow. Similarly if we are dealing with somebody we perceive
as 'shifty'; we expect or trust that they will take advantage. This may result in pre-
emptive action or precautions being taken. Trust is bound up with past
experience both directly with the person(s) concerned and indirectly, through
projected or anticipated experiences, thus trust is an intensely emotional and
human phenomenon. Figure 3-5 illustrates a model of the range of influences
that can affect our perception of trust [91].
Relationship
Access to people with
the information
If a problem-
say it direct
No double meaning
Don’t beat about the bush
Don’t avoid the issue
Do unto others as you would
have them do unto youHonesty
What we
say
What we
do
Reliability of
information
Carry out what is said
Information sharing
good and bad
Exchange of ideas
Having confidence in the person
Trust
Figure 3-5 Elements of Trust (Source: Whiteley, McCabe & Lawson [91, p440])
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Commitment is the physical and mental manifestation of the concept of trust. It is
the proof of trust. It is the willingness to reciprocate energy invested through trust
in a process of transformation of this energy into tangible results. Thus a 'trusting'
supervisor may back off from detailed specification and control of how tasks may
be performed. Commitment, means that another party will take this trust on board
and 'live up to' the spirit of the bargain by probably committing more personal
pride and obligation to 'do the right thing' than would otherwise be the case.
Loyalty occurs when trust and commitment are tested. It can be viewed as the
bankable capital of goodwill to reciprocate trust in times of adversity. One
demonstration of an act of loyalty is to sacrifice something in the short term to
maintain a long-term relationship intact and functioning for mutual advantage.
This clearly illustrates the linkages between trust, communication, commitment
and management style. Figure 3-5 also illustrates how much work is involved in
gaining and maintaining trust. Clearly, trust does not come pre-packaged in a
particular procurement system though characteristics of some systems establish
an environment in which trust is more likely to flourish than others.
Trust is a murky swamp of emotions. It is full of history, transfer of emotions from
'similar situations' and eternal hope. This phenomenon is largely ethereal in
nature. Given that trust is largely about perceptions and those perceptions are
based upon experience, it is interesting to investigate how person-to-person and
organisation-to-organisation negotiation shapes these perceptions. Negotiation is
a daily part of life—from resolving workloads, organising time-off, to exchanging
information in a meeting where give-and-take is part of the process.
Considering which procurement systems to choose on the basis of engendering
trust is problematic. The real issue is not which procurement system is best, but
rather which management style and system best facilitates conditions that
engender trust. A number of interesting conclusions emerged from a US study of
132 people of the effect of anger and compassion upon negotiation performance
[92]. One of these was that venting (that is demonstrating the emotion in a
physical or vocal form) is more likely to increase than to decrease anger in the
person venting. Venting becomes a rehearsal for the real thing and if this is not
exposed in debate then the venting remains as a festering sore—thus creating a
situation where anger becomes tangible is worse than defusing the situation as it
emerged. This is significant in that in negotiation and day-to-day relationships, it
appears better to clarify and resolve conflict as it arises or at least quickly, rather
than let it fester. This reinforces the importance of having a dispute resolution
system as described and illustrated in Figure 3-4 because so much of the dispute
resolution system depends upon parties negotiating in good faith (i.e. ethically).
The implication for dispute and conflict resolution is to recognise the legitimacy of
people holding different positions and to clarify them as quickly as possible to
allow mutual understanding to diffuse dispute situations. Findings from the
research of Alfred et al [92] on negotiating are summarised as:
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· Compassion serves to increase helping behaviour and decrease punishment
behaviour;
· Negative emotional regard will diminish negotiators' willingness to work with
each other in the future;
· Conversely, positive emotional regard will enhance the negotiators' desire to
work with each other in the future;
· The root of anger lies in the judgement made by one group about why another
group behaves in a manner harmful to them.
· People tend to over-attribute another person's behaviour and motives thus
misconceptions can easily develop.
Much of the relationship building and maintenance process critically depends
upon the way parties to a relationship perceived each other—Figure 3-5
illustrates this clearly.  So why should we concern ourselves with ethics and
negotiation when considering procurement issues? There are at least three
standards for evaluating strategies and tactics for negotiation: ethics, prudence
and practicality. Ethics refers to standards of personal or group morality.
Prudence refers to judgements made upon effectiveness. Practicality refers to
issues of cost-effectiveness, timeliness and other issues of a more concrete
nature with respect to achieving goals. Trust and perception can be highly
biased. Generally, we tend to perceive others in absolute terms (right or wrong)
but rationalise our behaviour in relative terms [93, p386].  Ethical negotiation
besets people on a day-to-day basis. They make their judgements on themselves
and others on this basis. Lewicki's research has shown that at least five
influences can encourage negotiators to suspend their own sense of ethical
standards. These include:
1. Acting as an agent for someone else and responding to their pressures at any
price acceptable to those they represent rather than adhere to their own
standards;
2. Viewing the whole process as a game;
3. Being part of a culture that tolerates or encourages bending or breaking the
rules to achieve success;
4. Being so loyal to a group that you can convince yourself that what you do is
acceptable in order to be rewarded for loyalty (in either financial or other
terms); and
5. Following orders and not considering the ethics of actions taken.
It is easy to dismiss project negotiation tactics as being part of a special process.
However, we continually negotiate what we do, what we take responsibility and
commitment for, and how we agreed to do things. We need to recognise that our
actions and decisions affect many people in project team(s). The way we conduct
ourselves will reflect the way others are prepared to deal with us and vice versa.
3.5.  Trust and Relationship Maintenance
The issue of breaking trust is also crucial in any relationship as it sows the seeds
of confidence destruction which often leads directly and, more importantly,
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indirectly into disputes and counterclaims. The term psychological contract
emerged in the 1960's to 1980's as a means of describing the emotional capital
invested in relationships. It mostly applied to employee and employer contracts—
formal or informal. Psychological contracts embrace specific perceived
obligations—as distinct from general expectations—that form general beliefs held
about a relationship. Expectations emanate from a wide variety of sources such
as past experiences, observation, rumours, reports or stories, and a range of
other intangible impression generated things. Psychological contracts entail
beliefs about what one party believes that he/she is entitled to because of a
perception of what was offered verbally and in writing. "Although psychological
contracts produce some expectations, not all expectations emanate from
perceived promises, and expectations can exist in the absence of perceived
promises or contracts " [94].
The interesting aspect of Robinson's research was that it focussed upon the
impact of an employee's belief that a breach of trust had occurred and the effect
that this had upon the employer/employee relationship [94]. In many ways this is
typical of general relationships between people working together in teams . She
maintained that behaviour and attitudes could be explained by (in the case she
cites) an employee's belief that a breach had occurred regardless of the reality of
any breach. It was the belief of a breach of trust that was important in explaining
behaviour and attitudes. Her paper raises useful insights into the way trust and
attitudes and behaviour are intertwined, and how we might learn from this work in
construction procurement strategies. Figure 3-6 illustrates the relationship
between breached trust experiences and how continued commitment is affected.
Event in which trust
is breached e.g.
broken promise,
action can be
perceived as hostile
or potentially
threatening
PERCEIVED  CAUSE
• Unintentional event
• Misunderstanding
• Temporary lapse
• Outside the responsibility
   of the others party
High prior trust
PERCEIVED  CAUSE
• Deliberate dishonest act
• Intentional betrayal
• Violation of trust
• Attempt at unfair use of
   authority/power
Low prior trust
Lowering levels of
commitment, willingness to
contribute voluntarily and
provide energy towards
higher power’s goals
Substantially unchanged
levels of commitment,
willingness to contribute
voluntarily and provide
energy towards higher
power’s goals
Figure 3-6 Relationship Between Experiences of Breached Trust and
Commitment or Goodwill (Source: Robinson [94] )
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Robinson empirically tested a group of 125 Master of Business Administration
(MBA) students in the USA who were working and studying part-time. The study
measured the psychological contract in terms of employee perceived actions and
resulting employee willingness to contribute to attaining organisational goals over
a 30-month period. Some of her findings, illustrated in Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-7,
are useful for understanding how people interact when breaches of trust are
perceived to have occurred in a supervisor/worker power situation where one
party has the authority to direct the action of another.
Partners A + B
trust each other
Partners A + B
committed to 
each other
Builds
Builds
TEST OF LOYALTY A needs B’s support
Trust +
commitment is
reinforced
Trust +
commitment is
diminished
Gets it
Doesn’t
gets it
Loyalty
Bank
Adds Detracts
Continue
relationship
?
Yes … but:
• Re-evaluation
• Reticence 
• Lower commitment
No ... 
Abandon 
relationship
Builds 
relationship
Figure 3-7 Loyalty, Trust and Commitment Under Tested Conditions
The implication of this work is that certain construction procurement systems may
require greater levels of prior trust than others. The traditional procurement
system with its emphasis on a fixed sum for a fixed stage of design encourages
builders to 'create' disputes to compensate for low profits [12]. In procurement
options where the manager of the project is acting as a consultant, the client and
other team members expect a 'professional attitude' such as sharing information.
Kwok measured trust and commitment as variables in his study of construction
alliances in public sector building works in Queensland [59]. Robinson measured
trust over time by administering three surveys to identify how commitment, loyalty
and willingness to contribute changed in the light of experiencing breaches of
trust [94]. This approach can be of use to study how trust, commitment and
loyalty operates within various procurement systems, particularly alliances.
Figure 3-7 illustrates what happens when loyalty is tested. One possible
outcomes illustrated is relationship reinforcement. Another is the relationship
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being called into question or diminished. Procurement systems bring with them
varying expectation of commitment and levels of trust. The client/consultant or
designer/contractor relationship is similar in many ways to an employer/employee
relationship in mutual vulnerability where expectations exist about likely
behaviour which affect openness, commitment and willingness to go beyond the
expected. This illustration dealt with team members interacting with other
individuals or teams, again its substance is quite independent of procurement
form, which explains why trust and commitment can occur or be absent in any
procurement form. Earlier, we touched on how leaders can use or abuse power
and in this chapter we discussed how trust and commitment is affected by power
use. All this of course is also influenced by the organisational culture which may
at one extreme be 'gung-ho' or at the other so conscious of meeting all
stakeholders' aspirations that it becomes totally paralysed. Organisational culture
is affected by its members and by the quality of the leadership and management
style of those in positions of influence and authority [52, 95-98].
3.6.  Teams and Leaders - Building a Foundation for Partnerships
The way a leader behaves is governed by the characteristics of leaders and
followers. These encompass the entire project teams in the facility supply chain
as well as the design and management facilitation groups. We saw how trust and
commitment is linked through empowerment and how this can liberate creative
energies in team members. In an empowerment approach, the dominant team
members relinquish authority to the follower because they probably have
knowledge power or aspects of personal power. We also saw how different forms
of power can be used to better liberate team member's energy and how loyalty,
trust and commitment is affected by breaches of trust. This brings us to the issue
of how management style and organisational culture affects the individual and
their perceptions of what to expect from team mates, co-workers and allied
project teams. The literature suggests that organisational culture releases
energy, enabling performance excellence, in a hierarchical manner [95-99].
Avolio [95] categorised four distinct organisation hierarchies:
· Level 1 - Adrift - Few symbols/images provide any sense of community
and/or cohesion. Members have difficulties identifying a core set of values or
ideals.  Decisions are not tied to precedents so members do not take
responsibility for their actions.
· Level 2 - Transactional (corrective) - There is a heavy concentration on
eliminating mistakes. People are generally recognised for what they do wrong
versus what they do right. There is little evidence of collegial support or any
significant willingness to be supportive of others.  The general environment is
characterised by risk avoidance where new ideas are hoarded by oneself.
· Level 3 - Transactional (constructive) - In the extreme cases everything
gets done through negotiation and contracts—if contracts are fulfilled then
appropriate rewards are provided to employees. At the higher end,
organisation’s members provide each other with support/recognition, and they
are willing to learn new skills/applications if adequately compensated for their
Chapter 3 - Developing Cross-Team Relationships
_________________________________________________________________
Page 51
efforts. Transactions not always so basic, and can be of longer duration.
Consistent honouring of agreements eventually builds the basis of trust
amongst organisation’s members.
· Level 4 - Transformational leadership - The organisation’s members more
easily identify core values. There is evidence of a collective focus on building
learning potential and performance. People feel comfortable questioning each
other and realise that they are all working toward a central purpose and/or
mission. Symbols and images signify important organisation values. Members
trust each other to do what’s right/moral.
The first two levels are characterised by group behaviours, whereas levels three
and four more closely resemble teams at work rather than groups at work. Level
4 is seen to have the greatest proximity to partnership and alliance relationships
though many project organisations which purport to use partnering arrangements
is more closely characterised by Level 3.
Figure 3-8 illustrates team development in terms of five management styles. We
can see the history of various management innovations in this progression. It is
interesting to note that an alliance or partnering arrangement operating at the
laissez faire level will probably have a poorer project performance than a
'traditional' system operating at a transformational level exhibiting use of the 4 I's.
LF
• LF - Laissez-faire - Avoiding leadership: abdicating responsibility
MBE(P)
• MBE(P) - Management-by-Exception (Passive) - Focussing on
mistakes only after they have occurred and patching problems
MBE-A-
• MBE(A) - Management-by-Exception (Active) -
Searching for what’s done wrong, not what’s done right
CT
• CT - Constructive Transactions - Developing well-
defined roles and expectations to achieve desired
performance quality
• 4 I’s   Idealised influence
    Inspirational motivation
    Intellectual stimulation
    Individual consideration
4 I’s I’
Gaining trust, respect, and confidence:
setting high standards of conduct, a role
model
Articulating the future desired state and a
plan to achieve it
Questioning the status quo and continuously
innovating, even at the peak of success
Energising people to develop and achieve
their full potential/performance
Figure 3-8 Leadership in Developing Teams (Source:  Avolio [95, p12] )
In well functioning teams where task leadership is assigned by competence and
willingness to take responsibility for outcomes, followers will exhibit favourable
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characteristics of leaders as they take charge of tasks. Much of what is
understood as intelligence is complex and multifaceted. In the supply chain and
at the assembly stage of project delivery, numerous intelligent people, sometimes
with few formal qualifications, assume a leadership role.
Numerous leadership academics have researched the nature of intelligence and
intelligent leadership. Mant [100] introduced the notion that intellectual 'firepower'
is only one of several aspects to be marshalled to produce intelligent leadership.
He shows that the most intelligent people may be carrying emotional baggage
that inhibits them from acting intelligently and making sound judgements. The
issue of judgement, wisdom and qualification (knowledge) provides interesting
insights into why teams of highly intelligent people are capable of makeing
disastrous decisions. One secret of teams working effectively and gaining and
maintaining each other's trust and commitment is their level of emotional
intelligence.
Table 3-4 illustrates this concept [101]. Goleman maintains that the skills required
for this type of intelligence can be learned. This is fortunate, as many team
members require these skills to function optimally. They can be facilitated
through good team coaching and leadership.  Many of these contribute to an
atmosphere where trust, commitment and loyalty can flourish [101].
Table 3-4 Facets of Emotional Intelligence (Source: Goleman [101] p95)
Intelligence Definition Hallmarks
Self-awareness · The ability to recognise and understand
your moods, emotions, and drives, as
well as their effect on others
· Self-confidence
· Realistic self assessment
· Self-depreciating sense
of  humour
Self-regulation · The ability to control or redirect disruptive
impulses and moods
· The propensity to suspend judgement -
to think before acting
· Trustworthiness, integrity
· Comfort with ambiguity
· Openness to change
Motivation · A passion to work for reasons that go
beyond money or status
· a propensity to pursue goals with energy
and persistence
· Strong drive to achieve
· Optimism, even in the
face of failure
· Organisational
commitment
Empathy · The ability to understand the emotional
makeup of other people
· Skill in treating people according to their
emotional reactions
· Expertise in building and
retaining talent
· Cross-cultural sensitivity
· Service to clients and
customers
Social Skill · Proficiency in managing relationships
and building networks
· An ability to find common ground and
build rapport
· Effectiveness in leading
change
· Persuasiveness
· Expertise in building and
leading teams
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Mant discusses useful insights into the nature of intelligence and how this
contributes to sound leadership. He cites the example of Bob Clifford from
Tasmania, a world leading designer and manufacturer of catamarans. Clifford
performed very poorly at school but designs his catamarans through a keen
sense of intuition drawing upon technical and scientific expertise from other team
members when needed. Mant likens much of the kinds of intelligence evidenced
by high performers as similar to that of artists—feeling, intuitive and emotional
aspects of intelligence. This is much like the human body when intelligence is
downloaded from the brain to the spinal column and limbs. When parking a car in
the dark in a confined space we take on the car's body as part of our own and we
park by 'feel'. Musicians also have this quality of intelligence when they 'feel' the
music. Sculptors shape the forms they create by almost coaxing the image out of
the materials they use. In this way intelligent team leaders (and followers acting
in a leadership role while in charge of a task), use intuition and emotional
intelligence to get the best from the resources they employ [100].
The main thrust of this book has made it clear that the traditional lump sum
procurement approach tends to detract from optimising a team's contribution to
the project due to structural impediments of the procurement system. However,
this still does not fully explain why some projects using the traditional system are
successful and others using alternative procurement systems less successful.
Part of the answer has been explained in the way trust, commitment and loyalty
is harnessed by sound leadership and appropriate use of power and authority to
best facilitate the highest levels of team contribution to project goals. Part lies in
the way teams operate. A team is more than simply a collection of people. A
team is a coherent entity focussed on common goals. In the more advanced
forms of organisational leadership described earlier, self-management and self-
direction was offered as the way forward.
The following summarises characteristics of self-managed teams [102]:
· Self managed teams take responsibility for themselves;
· They organise their work, monitor performance and alter strategies and day-
to-day actions to meet goals set by the team;
· They need a mature management style to set free their creative energies; and
· They can:
Ø enhance company performance;
Ø enhance organisational learning; and
Ø enhance employee’s commitment/participation.
Wageman argues from research that she undertook into organisations such as
Xerox, that there are at least two basic influences on team success. First, how
teams are designed and supported. Second, how the leader behaves in day-to-
day interactions. Key issues she discovered from her research indicates how
important high quality coaching is in sending cues to team members that they are
responsible for their own performance. She also stresses that timely feedback as
well as helping teams develops problem-solving strategies in team members.
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In terms of design features, the following was identified as needed [102 p53]:
1. Clear, engaging direction
2. Task interdependence
3. Authority to manage the work
4. Performance goals
5. Skill diversity of team members
6. Demographic diversity of team members
7. Team size (to be feasible for self-management and coaching)
8. Length of time the team has had a stable relationship (to develop coherency
and team spirit)
9. Group rewards
10. Information resources (sufficient to make decisions as a team and take both
personal and group responsibility for performance)
11. Availability of training (sufficient to effectively operate both individually and
as a team)
12. Basic material resources (sufficient to effectively operate both individually
and as a team)
Points 5 and 6 are important in a wider context. Diversity adds strength to teams
as it offers more ways of visualising problems and solutions. Teams can be held
in a mono-cultural straight jacket that inhibits wider consideration of the context of
issues [87]. This of course substantially depends upon the leadership style being
matched to follower readiness in which the leader's support behaviour is matched
to followers' necessary skills and knowledge and also their confidence and
commitment to successfully undertaking the task [103, p331]. The quality of the
leader's coaching provides an enabling mechanism to raise or lower the level of
team performance. Table 3-5 illustrates this.
Table 3-5 Leadership Coaching Advice (Source: adapted from Wageman, [102])
Positive Coaching Behaviours Potential Negative Influences
1. Providing reinforcers and other clues
that the group is responsible for
managing itself
1. Signalling that individuals (or the
leaders/managers) were responsible
for the team’s work
2. Appropriate problem-solving
consultation
2. Intervening in the task
3. Dealing with interpersonal problems in
the team through team-process
consultation
3. Identifying the team’s problems
4. Attending team meetings 4. Over-riding group decisions
5. Providing organisational-related data
According to a number of influential management thinkers, the close of the 20th
century was accompanied by disquiet about the way in which the traditional
corporate model serves society [7, 81, 104-108].  Amongst this criticism is the
comment that "People at all levels in organisations realised that traditional
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conceptions of capitalist organisation were frequently inefficient, unresponsive,
cumbersome and demotivating.  … There is no shortage of evidence to indicate
that, people in their organisations responded by taking initiative in working
together to provide new products and services, without waiting for command from
above" [108, p1-2]. There are interesting aspects about that quote. First, that it
could have applied equally well to communism, indeed any totalitarian system
and second, that it applies to the relationship between teams and leaders. The
notion of flexibility as a team virtue is not new [109, 110]. There are calls for not
so much more leadership but more flexible leadership [108, p227]. There has
also been calls for 'leaders' to facilitate and allow the collective team's abilities to
accomplish more than would otherwise be the case—to unleash the power of
teamwork through greater autonomy, self-management and self-direction [111].
This brief reflection upon the literature strongly supports the idea that many
teams are ready for the kind of leadership style that liberates them to get on with
the job.  A recent benchmarking study sponsored by the Construction Industry
Institute Australia reinforces these conclusions [112]. Figure 3-9 illustrates the
way in which teams can be mobilised to achieve superior project outcomes. It is
evident that there are approaches that enhance team management facilitating
actions leading to success and there are approaches that do not.
• Client satisfaction
• Value for money
• Timeliness
• Good communications
• Cohesiveness
• Customer Focus
• Goal orientation
•  Team building
• Internalisation
• Role & task definition
• Team Culture
• Team mix/size
• Leadership
• Decision making
• Conflict management
• High value communications
• Informal communications
• communication skills
• Media matching
Project 
Success
Team
Characteristics
Team Management
Figure 3-9 Winning Teams (Source: adapted from Testi et. Al. [112])
Teams bring with them their own unique blend of problem solving, technical and
interpersonal skills with varying strengths of complimentarily. Members bring with
them attitudes and behaviour patterns based on past and current experiences.
They accept varying degrees of accountability and responsibility depending upon
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their personalities, the workplace environment and the actions of the leader.  The
commitment to success that teams exhibit varies with their goal alignment, trust
and loyalty to one another and/or the organisation (these points have been
discussed in more detail earlier).  Their performance is a function of this dynamic.
Teams that are substantially unfocussed on common objectives merely resemble
a working group or committee sharing ideas and perspectives. The pseudo-team
has not focussed upon collective purpose and is not trying hard to achieve any
goals or objectives. The potential team has that desire to be focussed but lacks
clear direction or is inhibited by organisational or other performance barriers.
Real teams are committed and focussed towards common purpose but also
display a working approach that demonstrates mutual accountability and
commitment. High performing teams go beyond this capacity—they transcend
their own and team goals to make the organisational goals their first priority [113].
However, teams fail to achieve goals even when this commitment is present.
Often this failure can be explained by organisational barriers and hurdles placed
by the nature and characteristics of the prevailing corporate culture [104-108].
Table 3-6 provides a variety of common dysfunctions leading to poor team
performance [114]. Sometimes team dynamics poisons team performance. Each
team member will have a mutual propensity for acceptance by, and attraction
towards, other team members. High attraction and acceptance leads to
psychological membership with internalisation and commitment being fully
realised. High attraction and low acceptance leads to preferential membership
where commitment is somewhat conditional or tentative, as is the case with
marginal membership having high acceptance but low attraction. The least
committed state is low acceptance and low attraction, which leads to alienated
membership of a team. Thus reasons for teams not working often lie with internal
causation from team and individual dynamics as well as the characteristics of the
organisation and/or its leadership style [83].
It can now be better appreciated the impact that the workplace environment has
upon team performance—from a physical as well as psychological point of view. It
is pointless for an unprincipled manipulative leader to cajole team members using
charismatic or transformational4 leadership styles when the team members see that
their efforts are being ruthlessly exploited. Similarly, a truly superior quality leader
and organisation that 'does the right thing' with well-focussed ethical goals cannot
succeed with a team that is dysfunctional. It has been stressed in this section that
diverse skills are required to deliver complex projects. It has also been stressed that
those people with these skills will come from a diverse background and have
different world-views. There is widespread agreement that tolerance of diversity,
indeed welcoming diversity is essential for the successful project teams of the 21st
century [83, 87, 105, 108].
                                                
4 For more detailed examination of transactional and transformational leadership literature see
[96, 97, 99] or Barker J.R. on the website URL http://learning.mit.edu/res/kr/barker/barker-
webers.htm
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Table 3-6 Why Teams Do Not Work (Source: Robbins & Finlay [114, p14])
Problem Symptom Solution
Mismatched needs People with private
agendas working at cross
purposes
Get hidden agendas out on the table
by asking what people want,
personally, from teaming.
Confused goals or
Cluttered
objectives
People don’t know what to
do or it doesn’t make
sense
Clarify the reasons the team exists:
define its purpose and expected
outcomes.
Unresolved roles Team members are
uncertain what their job is
Inform team members what is
expected of them
Bad decision
making
Teams may be making the
right decisions, but in the
wrong way
Choose a decision making approach
appropriate to each decision
Bad policies,
stupid procedures
Team is at the mercy of an
employee 'handbook from
hell'
Throw away the book and start
making sense
Personality
conflicts
Team members  do not
get along
Learn what team members expect
and want from one another, what they
prefer, how they differ, start valuing
and using differences
Bad leadership Leadership is tentative, in-
consistent, or stupid
The leader must learn to serve the
team and keep its vision alive or leave
leadership to someone else
Bleary vision Leadership has 'foisted a
bill of goods' on the team
Get a better vision or go away
Anti-team culture The organisation is not
really committed to the
idea of teams
Team for the right reasons or don’t
team at all; never force people into a
team
Insufficient
feedback and
information
Performance is not being
measured; team members
are groping in the dark
Create a system of free flow of useful
information to and from all team
members
Ill-conceived
reward systems
People are being
rewarded for the wrong
things
Design rewards that make teams feel
safe doing their job; reward teaming
as well as individual behaviours
Lack of team trust The team is not a team
because members are
unable to commit to it
Stop being untrustworthy, or disband
or reform the team
3.7.  Chapter Summary
It was highlighted at the start of this chapter that many researchers have argued
that the form of procurement is largely irrelevant and that the real issue is how
the procurement option enhances or inhibits team members to maximise their
constructive input to achieve project goals .
Essential features of partnering/alliancing introduced some important dimensions
of the complex environment—both physical and psychological—that affects
teams and leaders. The extent to which the client/client representative exerts
design influence led to issues of organisational learning and enabling innovation
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through design/construction team synergy. It was important to explore how power
and influence, trust commitment and loyalty, and trust and negotiation are linked
to and advance our fundamental understanding about the reasons why a
particular management approach may be appropriate. The management style
and approach—mainly concerned with attitudes, the process of facilitating team
spirit and the dynamics of team relationships—is more important than the
procurement choice itself. The appropriate choice of project delivery system is
about not only choosing the best delivery method, but also choosing the most
appropriate management style and approach.
In the next chapter the nature and characteristics of partnering and alliancing will
be discussed from a perspective of how it best provides the project delivery
mechanism with a more inclusive management style can be deployed which
better engenders trust and commitment.
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CHAPTER 4. ENTERPRISE NETWORKS, PARTNERING AND
ALLIANCING
Choices of procurement method were presented in the second chapter. It was
noted that other than when using the traditional procurement method, the
adopted choice should not affect the capacity of a partnering or alliancing
strategy to achieve the project goals  through teamwork. In the third chapter we
presented three essential features of partnering or alliancing—mutual objectives,
continuous improvement and problem resolution arrangements. We also
discussed characteristics of the underlying human relationship ethos that must be
engendered for it to be successfully applied. In this chapter we explore the
features and characteristics of enterprise networks and explain how these may
prepare project teams more fully to realise their potential in the 21st century.
Limerick et al [108] has developed an interesting taxonomy of management
evolution culminating in a model for success in dealing with the turbulence and
uncertainty of today's competitive  climate. Table 4-1 illustrates their four
management blueprints. The fourth management blueprint is the recommended
direction for the immediate future as we have now entered the 21st century.
Table 4-1 The Four Management Blueprints (Source Limerick et al.  [108, p30])
First
Blueprint
Second
Blueprint
Third
Blueprint
Fourth
Blueprint
Classical Human Systems Collaborative
organisations
Organisational
forms
Functional
Mechanistic
Organic
Inter-locking
Matrix
Contingency
Divisional
Loosely coupled
networks and
alliances
Management
principles
Hierarchy Supportive
relationships
Differentiation Empowerment
and collaborative
individualism
Managerial
processes/
forms
Management
functions
Democratic
leadership
Open systems
analysis
Management of
meaning
Managerial skills Person-to-
person control
Goal setting
Facilitation
Rational/
diagnostic
Empathetic
Proactive
Managerial
values
Efficiency
Productivity
Self-
actualisation
Social support
Self-regulation Social
sustainability
Ecological
balance
Many companies have moved to the third blueprint, but have difficulty in moving
forward. This may be due to fear of higher levels of management losing control
over their management authority prerogative and fear over loss of competitive
advantage through networking and outsourcing. The Fourth Blueprint also relies
upon considerable bases of mutual trust and respect requiring readiness or
'maturity' from management and partner organisations stemming from loosely
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coupled organisations. This requires a greater capacity for real rather than
espoused empowerment than Third Blueprint managers can cope with. Indeed,
Limerick et al [108] describes an uncomfortable staging post between Third and
Fourth Blueprint organisations where the worst of cases prevail. 'Neocorporate
bureaucracy' is a new form of corporatism, still embedded in the major paradigm
of the hierarchical corporate organisation, but with an attempt to apply some
precepts of the Fourth Blueprint. The effect is like grafting the legs of a gazelle
onto an elephant with managers becoming more risk-averse. Further, by holding
onto hierarchy and in attempting to reduce costs through delayering
organisational structure while maintaining mechanistic control, they merely push
more of the cost and effort of formal accountability to lower levels of
management. This results in greater stress for those remaining due to lowering of
flexibility and dis-empowering through bureaucratic control [108, p84].
Such approaches snatch defeat from the jaws of potential success.  Instead of
releasing energy from devolution of authority, the result is further strategic control
that stifles initiative and results in cynicism—as this process is seen as pseudo-
devolution. These approaches also alienate those valuable members of teams
who can constructively critique performance and enact organisational learning.
Such people view the hierarchy as corporate nazis and withdraw their valuable
input from the decision making process. Organisational cultural diversity is lost in
the neocorporate bureaucracy.
Limerick et al [108, p91] provides sound advice on how to establish a Fourth
Blueprint organisation. These are centred on forming strategic loosely coupled
alliances with a management emphasis required on:
1. Liberating managers;
2. Developing boundary roles;
3. Developing communication systems (particularly effective IT systems that
allow such groups to share meaning);
4. Get the mindset right to benefit from alliancing;
5. Establish the alliance carefully (choose partners carefully with compatible
organisational structures and synergy of contribution);
6. Define the focus;
7. Manage the soft issues (trust, commitment etc.);
8. Manage the hard edge processes too (get commitment on a mutual set of
expectations and understanding of acceptable behaviours of each partner);
and
9. Manage the network control systems (provide sufficient resources for effective
IT and effective human contact).
Another intrinsic element of the Fourth Blueprint is organisational learning and
team learning. This is achieved through sharing the diversity of available views
within groups characterised by independent collaborative individuals with high
levels of communication and people skills. Companies that get the most out of
alliances are those that learn from each other [115]. Limerick et al argues that
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companies have to become action-learning organisations, that are self-reflective
and can transcend and critique their own identity, values, assumptions and
mission that is initiated and controlled by line managers themselves [108, p179].
These organisations do this through not only supporting critical appraisal but
also, and more importantly, to provide feedback for lessons learned to be
transformed into subsequent action. This requires organisations to welcome both
challenge and experimentation through the establishment of the organisation as
a learning community. This would be composed of both inside-organisation
people and informed external participants who are free of the internal
assumptions and mindsets of organisational members. The approach exemplified
by the Fourth Blueprint is strongly supported by management theorists and
commentators. For example, in the Karpin Report [116] many examples are cited
of a gradual global shift taking place towards this new paradigm. Characteristics
of the Fourth Blueprint model are offered as current world best practice [116,
117, Section II].
The way forward for best gaining advantages for this business arrangement has
been identified as the formation of relationship-based enterprises. The actual
form of these varies, but all have in common a basis of partnership with varying
degrees of autonomy, flexibility of action and physical proximity.  At the most
isolated and fragmented extreme of this continuum lies single firms who compete
and take on projects under a variety of contractual forms. At the other extreme of
this continuum lies firms who bring together their resources to create alliances
and/or joint ventures which act as a single organisation but maintaining their
separate identities. In the case of joint ventures a new legal entity will be created
seconding resources from host firms. Both joint ventures and alliances often have
the customer as a partner in this arrangement—either on a once off basis for a
specific project or to develop a continuing relationship. The on-call contracting
method described in Chapter 1 can be considered as both a procurement method
and a relationship type. Relationship entities undertaking projects may choose to
follow any procurement of the paths described in Chapter 1.
4.1.  The Development of Enterprise Networks
The concept of networks coming together to complete projects is not new. Indeed
some of the most significant buildings in Europe and elsewhere were constructed
using workers from craft guilds. These business entities did not constitute legal
entities as recognised today (such as businesses and firms). They did, however,
act as firms and operated as clusters of workers drawn together on a significant
enterprise often sharing resources, certainly sharing knowledge, mutually
adjusting to take advantage of opportunities and relating on a sound basis of
trust. Working in close proximity has been recognised as a competitive
advantage for firms. Michael Porter has studied the competitive advantage of
cluster organisations serving customers. He cites examples—the wine industry in
California, the entertainment industry in Hollywood, shoes and fashion apparel in
Italy, cork and wood products in Portugal. In understanding the advantage of
such clusters, he offers insights into why successful alliances of firms provide
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competitive advantage and both survival and growth for their participants. He
argues that it is because their location is based on a competitive advantage of
infrastructure [118].
The ability to rapidly exchange ideas is one principal basis of communication
infrastructure. Surface communication such as road, rail and water-based
transport and efficient air transport facilities are very important but it is their ability
to get people together solving problems, building relationships and sharing ideas
on improvement that is the underlying factor contributing to communication
infrastructure. Over the second half of this century, the term communications has
shifted from surface, sea and air to telecommunications. The ability to send
messages by telex and later fax has revolutionised businesses. Telephony,
particular cellular phones, has had a major impact from both business and private
interaction. The rise in general use of the Internet during the close of the 20th
century has had a profound impact upon the exchange of ideas and perceptions.
With electronic data interchange (EDI), transfer of graphics, video images, text
and data files adding to the repertoire of communication media, the provision of
infrastructure to support this kind of knowledge exchange is crucial to successful
networks. Clusters of individuals and firms are increasingly linked together
through electronic infrastructure to rapidly exchange information, data and ideas.
Trust, commitment, and aspirational dimensions of relationships are built and
maintained effectively through a combination of factors but face-to-face contact is
nevertheless the preferred option.
Many of the clusters that Porter cites are formed through local engagement.
Members of these clusters are in fairly close proximity where road, rail, plane and
other forms of transport infrastructure are important. Communications
infrastructure and social links are essential for clusters working collectively to
upgrade, improve and add value [118]. Combining communication infrastructure
and local expertise and cluster development can lead to significant gains in
productivity and competitiveness. This has been demonstrated by the
manufacturing sector where clusters develop and spawn facilities. In this
arrangement, offshore factories enhance their value adding activities through
Fourth Blueprint principles and intelligent use of ideas-sharing and local network
cluster development. These successful factories progress from being a low-cost
manufacturing offshore plant, to one in which new products are designed,
developed exported. They migrate from being a server or outpost factory to being
a lead factory and centre of excellence [119].
If this model is applied to the construction industry then a cluster relationship
approach may lead to adding value to the supplier and subcontractor part of the
supply chain. Skill improvement for the design disciplines can also be developed
through more open relationships with the delivery and assembly part of the
supply chain for construction clients. Alliancing  and joint venturing is a logical
development from design and construction to operation and maintenance.
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The case for bringing together parts of supply chain clusters has been persuasively
argued where design and construction teams share a physical working space [77].
Luck and Newcombe cite benefits of improved integration and coordination as
well communication using authoritative references from the management
literature. In their concluding remarks they make an important point about the role
of informal mutual adjustment where personal contact and positive interaction
leads to problems being addressed as a matter of course rather than through
formalised and ritualised mechanisms. This is an important point in
understanding how trust is developed in clusters of workers, where not only
information and ideas are exchanged but bonds are developed through personal
contact and where immediacy of access is made possible through a
communication infrastructure.
We have seen how enterprise networks are based on a foundation of effective
interaction using good quality communication infrastructure of IT delivery and for
enabling people to interact freely to share ideas. This is, as we saw in Chapter 3,
is the fundamental feedstock of building trust and is illustrated in Figure 4-1
below.
Low High
Cooperative
interaction for
improvement
Cooperative
interaction for
problem solving
Cooperative
interaction for
dispute resolution
Cooperative
interaction for
coordination
Cooperative
interaction for effective
communication
Cooperation +
forgiveness for making
genuine mistakes
Cooperation +
commitment to
achieve shared
goals
Cooperation,
trust  + preparedness
to understand other’s
aspirations + goals
Figure 4-1 Drivers of Trusting Relationships
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The quality of a relationship is driven by sharing information, joint problem solving
and sharing ideas to arrive at common goals that meet project objectives. Figure
4-1 serves to remind us how any working relationship is built and what elements
of the interactions need to be heeded to maintain the relationship.
4.2.  Types of Joint Enterprise Arrangements
Just as it was important to document the types of procurement systems in
Chapter 1 for us to gain an understanding of the continuum of options available, it
is also important to review the alliance form options.
Joint Marketing/Distribution
HIGH RISK, MAXIMUM USE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, HIGH COST
LOW RISK, MINIMUM USE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, LOW COST
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
Licensing/Private Label
Research+Development/
Technology Transfer
Joint Venture/Equity
Take-Over/
Merger
Complete acquisition of one company by another.
Companies are merged into a single corporate entity
Two companies cooperate on the creation of a new,
separate company.
Two companies join in a research + development
project to promote a new technology or product or
service
One company develops a product or
service to be marketed + sold by
another
One company joins with an other to
market, sell, and distribute a product
Figure 4-2 Alliance Continuum from a Risk Perspective (Source: Segil [120]).
The continuum presented in Figure 4-2 is based on the typology described by
Segil [120] and is taken from a marketing and manufacturing perspective,
although this can be compared to construction project alliance forms.
At the apex lies the vertical integration of the supply chain where one company
may voluntarily merge with an other firm to maintain an indefinite and continued
business alliance which is internalised to the extent that the joined companies
become one. For example a developer may merge or buy out a construction arm
and perhaps several key subcontractor suppliers. This arrangement remains as a
permanent situation until various 'arms' are sold off or otherwise disposed of.
Joint ventures are common in the construction industry particularly in forming
consortia to undertake a BOT/BOO/BOOT project. The above research and
development venture may be considered analogous to a BOT/BOO/BOOT
partner that uses their specialised skill as an equity stake to establish with others
the project partnership network and subsequently transfer their stake in the
project to others. Such an entrepreneurial stake may include identifying the
customer need, developing the project concept or locating the financing entities,
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developing the legal structure for a project ownership group and negotiating the
operating concession. This type of entrepreneur would sell their stake to take an
interest in another project. The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
equivalent is hard to find in the construction industry unless a franchised
consultancy fits this category but such examples are rare. The traditional
partnering or alliancing arrangement appears to be the closest equivalent in the
construction industry to joint marketing/distribution. Mergers and/or acquisitions
in the construction industry seem to be centred on funding issues, technological
transfer or access to markets. The changing market in Australia with large
German contractors merging or acquiring Australian companies is an example.
These companies may be better placed to diffuse global best-practice, better
able to commit equity on BOT/BOO/BOOT projects, better able to withstand a
cyclical industry notorious for its booms and busts and better able to globally
centralise research and development activities.
Figure 4-2 described different sorts of joint relationships that facilitate a project,
however, it lacks any description of mental models that participants may carry in
their heads about the relationship they will experience in delivering a product or
project. Figure 4-3 provides a useful description of these mental models [117].
Degree of:
• complexity
• time
• ROI
• competitive
  advantage
• customer
  satisfaction
• innovation
Vendor:
• Trader
• Price is No. 1
  requirement
• Little
  differentiation
• Low margins
• Little loyalty
Supplier:
• IFOTA1
• Differentiation
• Adding value
• Reducing costs
• Innovation
• Providing expertise
Partner:
• Sharing
   trust
   strategy + information
   vision
• Discover, create, provide
    world-class products +
    services
0 4 8 10
Sales
representative
Trader Account
Manager
Key Account
Manager
Partnership 
Manager
+ the 12
motivators
1.   Add value
2.   Reduce costs
3.   Improve communication
4.   Develop trust
5.   Resolve conflicts
6.   Remove hidden agendas
7.   Provide leadership
8.   Empower people
9.   Gain commitment
10.  Develop ownership
11.  Break down departmental
      barriers
12. Remove fear
      (internal and/or External)
IFOTA1 = In full, on time, to A1 specifications
Figure 4-3 The Alliancing and Partnering  Mindset. (Source: Lendrum [117, p12] )
The vendor relationship mindset is based upon the single transaction mentality
where both sides attempt to gain maximum financial advantage. The customer
wants the goods at the cheapest cost, the supplier seeks to maximise the profit
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through possible claw-backs of the quality, taking advantage of making claims for
anything not explicitly agreed to at the time of sale. The 'fine print' prevails in
complicated contracts. The success of winning a contract is based on an open
tender system and loyalty on either side is virtually absent.
The supplier relies on continued sales to the customer and attempts to offer extra
value into products, service through innovation, support and quality management.
Many subcontractors have reached this level as 'favoured' to qualify for pre-
selection to their contractors though contracts may be tendered and a multi-
criteria based decision may determine the success of selected tenders. The
person responsible for negotiation and marketing would be anxious to maintain
credibility to deserve continuing this supplier relationship.
The partnership relationship requires all the attributes of the supplier—but more.
In addition, there needs to be the mutual trust, loyalty and commitment so often
absent in full in the other two categories. This is achieved because the customer
believes the partner to be a world-class performer who can provide innovative
products that stretch beyond incremental improvement gains. The 12 motivator
identifiers illustrated in Figure 4-3 facilitate this trust and commitment.
Figure 4-4 illustrates how the alliance mindset delivers benefit.
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sustained over time
Figure 4-4 How Alliances Deliver Value (Source: Lendrum [117, p20] )
Table 4-2 presents base level benefits for customers and suppliers. These are
typical of sound management practice and one would hope to see many of these
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in any event. Benefits from benchmarking, innovation, improved attitude and
customer satisfaction requires hard work and commitment from both sides, so the
business maturity levels must be very high to facilitate this process.
Table 4-2 Customer and Supplier Base Level Benefits (Source: Lendrum [117])
Customer
Base Level Benefits
Supplier
Base Level Benefits
· Improved quality, fewer rejects, less waste
· Lower operational costs
· Reduced inspection times
· Customer non-conformance complaints
drastically reduced
· Lower prices in real-terms (total costs)
· Superior performance or effect at lower,
equivalent (or even higher) prices, i.e.
greater value for money
· Improved reliability, flexibility and
dependability of supply
· Improved cash-flow and reduced working
capital costs
· Lower inventory and cycle times
· Reduced product/service development time
· Fewer hassles and less frustration
· More time and resources available for
downstream customers
· Increased margins (I.e. increased total
value)
· Improved communication and people
relationships
· Increased market share
· Aggregate purchasing
· Supplier-managed inventories
· Early supplier/extended range of products
and services
· Elimination of waste associated with
tenders, annual auctions and multiple
   suppliers
· Elimination of litigation and adversarial
confrontation
· Larger volumes of products and services
(domestic and/or export)
· Longer-term stability of supply
· Greater stability of forecasts
· Improved production efficiencies/cycle
times
· Higher quality at lower operational costs
· Lower costs in real terms
· Fewer hassles less frustration
· Improved skills from joint training
· Increased margins
· Fewer customer complaints/less waste
· Improved communication and people
relationships (internal and external)
· Price premium over the competition (I.e.
greater value for money)
· Achievement of preferred
supplier/preferred relationship status
· Increased market share and access to new
markets
· The partnership becomes a benchmark for
other customer/supplier relationships
· Greater responsiveness and flexibility in
fulfilling customer expectations and
   resolving customer complaints
· Improved rate of product/service
development
· Improved logistics and delivery systems
· Greater integration of activities between
divisions/departments etc.
· Fewer process steps and less complexity
· Early involvement in product or service
development
· Scrapping of the dreaded tender system
· Elimination of litigation and adversarial
confrontations
4.3.  Australian Partnering Research Study Results
The Construction Industry Institute Australia (CIIA ) stress that there is no
partnering contract as such, rather an agreed partnering charter forms the basis
of a working agreement that is intended to shape a non-adversarial culture to
promote win-win working relationships between partners. This is achieved
through the aim to…"foster cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships
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among project stakeholders by developing an explicit strategy of commitment
and communication. These goals are documented in a charter that stands
alongside legally-binding contractual arrangements."  [121, p11]. The CIIA report
is based upon a comprehensive study of 32 Australian projects with some 131
questions asked of senior members of partnering teams. This study is significant
as a thorough research output in which industry contributors and senior
academics worked together on a research task force. The conclusions of the
report list three clusters of useful findings [121, p33-35]:
1. Good communication and high levels of trust between partners obviated
much of the conflict and divisiveness that leads to a litigious outcome. An
alternative dispute resolution to the business as usual legal wrangles
included an agreed dispute escalation mechanism.
2. The results indicated that "partnering  had reduced claims, disputes, delays
and the need for reworking, whilst improving safety and profit margin."
3. Technology transfer was seen to promote innovation diffusion when
partnerships were established early on in the project life cycle.
Interesting insights were provided from the 1996 CIIA  report. Public sector clients
accounted for 91% of projects investigated. Responses to the question
'partnering in this project has been a great success' yielded the following results5:
· Strongly agree 38.7%
· Agree 35.5%
· Neither agree nor disagree 3.2%
· Disagree 6.5%
· Strongly disagree 16.1%
Almost all (85%) of respondents said that they would undertake another
partnering project. In 42% of the cases partnering was adopted pre-award and in
88% of these a pre-tender meeting was held with potential contractors. In 81% of
the case studies the end-user had been part of the partnering arrangement. In
cases where partnering had been deemed a success, 87% of respondents
agreed that the partnering arrangement had led to lower administrative costs
because of the elimination of defensive case building [121, p31].
The above results are supported by work undertaken on strategic alliance
experiences gained from a survey of 51 companies involved in alliances with the
Queensland Public sector as client. In that study the 3 highest ranked benefits
out of 13 measured were cooperation, resolution of problems and coordination.
[59, p137]. It is interesting though that 'inter-organisational managerial skills' and
'access to technologies' ranked 12th and last out of the 13 identified benefits
tested6 [59, p158]. Tables 4-3 to 4-8 summarise results from the 1996 CIIA report
on partnering in Australia.
                                                
5 Scores indicated that the mean perception of success was 3.83 on a 5-point scale.
6 Kwok notes that 8 out of 12 of the respondents that had been engaged in an alliance in the past
had abandoned it, mainly on poor performance grounds of subcontractors [59]
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Table 4-3 Essential Partnering Plan (Source: adapted from CIIA , [121])
Partnering Plan
Components
Survey
Agreement
     Comments:
1. Independent facilitator 84%
2. Commitment of senior
management
100%
3. Charter 85%
4. High level workshop
participation
94%
5. Dispute resolution
plan
93%
6. Implementation plan 84%
7. Continuous partnering
evaluation
97%
8. Finalising workshop 84%
· There is a definite need for an action rather
than rhetoric approach.
· Commitment, particularly from senior
management is essential
· Problems are expected but so is a rational
and reasonable way of dealing with them.
Essential components of partnering were investigated and the CIIA  1996 study
results are presented in Table 4-3 [121, p20]. An important aspect of the
components presented is that the partnering arrangement requires action plans.
The need for workshops and an external facilitator is an interesting issue as it
implies that survey participants see the need for guidance from a mutually trusted
person to gain commitment and confidence in the process. This accords with
other recent literature [9, 117]. Table 4-4 illustrates the CIIA study results
regarding content covered in workshops [121, p21].
Table 4-4 Partnering Workshop Content (Source: adapted from CIIA, [121])
Content Covered in
Workshops
Projects
Perceived
a Success
Projects
Perceived
 a Failure
Comments
1. Self-perception exercises 56% 43%
2. Training in team skills 39% 43%
3. Development of goals and
objectives
96% 86%
4. Dispute resolution plan 89% 43%
5. Anticipated problems 78% 71%
6. Action plan to address
problems
78% 57%
7. Development of a charter 100% 100%
8. Celebration 89% 29%
Significant differences
between projects
(perceived as a success or
a failure)
· Dealing with problems
as they inevitably arise.
· Commitment to training
and development
appears poorly
cultivated
It appears that the importance of action plans is reinforced by the gap in need for
them when comparing successful projects versus unsuccessful ones.  In essence
this complies with the adage 'failing to plan, planning to fail'. Where there was a
perceived need for planning and action that was reported to have widely differing
perceptions, there was a corresponding result in perceived success or otherwise
with the project (items 4 and 6 above). Following on the theme of a need to plan
for success, the CIIA  study reveals interesting insights into their perceived types
of plans needed for successful projects.
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Of the successful projects in the CIIA  study, Table 4-5 illustrates the respondent's
perceptions of what elements of the partnering  plan were necessary. While the
interesting element is the low level of need for mechanisms for sharing risk and
benefits (24%) and a process for orienting new partner members (43%), the other
elements seek a formal structure with all being able to easily and transparently
understand their roles and interaction.
Table 4-5 Partnering Plan Study Elements (Source: adapted from CIIA, [121])
Elements of the
Partnering Plan
Survey
Agreement
Comments:
Roles & responsibilities of each
organisation as it relates to them
71%
Measurable objectives relating to
each partnering goal
67%
Written description of the dispute
resolution process
76%
Mechanism for sharing risks and
benefits
24%
A process to orient new team
members
43%
The elements that attract strong
agreement are general issues of good
management.
· The disagreement on mechanisms to
share risks and benefits appear to
indicate an underdevelopment of trust
and commitment.
· Orientation should aid both project
understanding and commitment.
Where partnering was considered unsuccessful, low tenders correlated with
partnering failure. This reinforces the ideal of value for money rather than
cheapest price. Continuous evaluation for the successfully partnered project was
evident for 90% of that group of respondents. Table 4-6 illustrates the types of
evaluation and the extent.
Table 4-6 Study Partnering Evaluation on Successful Projects
(Source: adapted from CIIA, [121])
Type of Partnering Evaluation Survey
Agreement
Comments:
Regular formal partnering meetings 91%
Minutes kept of partnering meetings 91%
Regular meetings with sub-contractors 67%
Daily information meetings 45%
Periodic monitoring against mutually
agreed goals
100%
Evaluation sheets filled out with results
discussed at meetings
77%
Periodic workshops held to focus on
unresolved issues and problems
59%
· Again many areas of agreement
relate to general good
management practice
· The relative reticence in holding
workshops to focus on resolution
of problems indicates some
evidence of denial about
problems in partnerships and
how these may be brought out
into the open and resolved.
The CIIA  (1996) study presents benefits of partnering , illustrated in Table 4-7
below. Clustering and summarisation of these benefits correlates positively with
factors contributing to overall project success. These again fall into two major
groups. First, it presents a group of general good management practices such as
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time, cost and quality. Second, the perceived benefits of partnering are solidly
placed in reduced energy being expended on battling entrenched positions.
Disputes are more effectively dealt with through open communication and dispute
resolution procedures minimise legal and administration transaction costs. While
these are clearly the espoused values, aspects of practice (illustrated as %ages
in bold in Tables 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6) indicate a gap in application of the rhetoric of
planning and managing disputes.
Table 4-7 Study Partnering Benefits (Source CIIA, [121])
Partnering Benefits Survey
Agreement
Comments:
Reduced exposure to litigation through open
communications and issue resolution strategies
91%
Lower risk of cost overruns because of better cost
control
61%
Lower risk of time delays because of better time
control
65%
Better quality product 78%
Lower administration costs because of elimination
of defensive case building
87%
Increased opportunity for a financially successful
project because of the non-adversarial attitudes
96%
· Again many areas of
agreement relate to
general good
management practice
· The strong focus on
dispute resolution and
conflict management
indicates a defining
difference between
partnering and non-
partnering.
Table 4-8 presents the CIIA results on partnering problems. Several of these
potential problems were evidently not realised—for example, none of the
participants saw the effort and cost of partnering a real problem. There was low
agreement on potential problems related to dispute and problems not being
adequately dealt with.  This may be explained by the strong agreement on the
prevailing conditioning in the construction industry towards entrenched positions
in readiness for a win-lose approach and a lack of trust and commitment being
adequately realised. There was 100% agreement on commercial pressure
problems. This indicates a level of maturity and ethical integrity in using
partnering by recognising the danger of compromising trust when monetary gain
comes before principled action . Design problems and design communication
issues still remain problematical to the partnering participants. This may be
explained by a lack of including the design team fully in the partnering process. In
71% of cases where partnering had failed, participants felt that the design
consultants should have been more thoroughly included in the process, whereas
in successful partnering projects this figure was only 17% [121, p26].
The CIIA  survey [121] provides useful and rigorous data that is current and
relevant to the development of partnering arrangements in the Australian
construction industry. Clearly the question of maturity in terms of readiness to
embrace such cooperative arrangements is in a positive growth stage but as yet
not fully realised. Table 4-8 presents the CIIA results on partnering problems.
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Table 4-8 CIIA Study Problems Encountered (Source CIIA, [121])
Problems Encountered with Partnering Participants Survey
Agreement
Being conditioned in a win-lose environment 71%
Fully understanding the partnering concept 43%
Seeing staff training as essential to partnering 14%
Project should have been more carefully selected for its suitability for partnering 57%
Key sub-contractors should have been more thoroughly included in process 57%
Too many problems with plans and specifications from design consultants
during the construction stage
86%
Design consultants and other consultants should have been more thoroughly
included in the process
71%
Continuity of open and honest communication not achieved 86%
Technology problems (incompatible hardware/software) 43%
Dealing with a bureaucratic organisation impeding effectiveness 71%
Commercial pressure compromise the partnering attitude 100%
Issues and problems allowed to slide and escalate 43%
Partners not willing to communicate outside the contract discussions 29%
Partners not willing to compromise on craft team solutions 57%
Up front time required and cost for partnering process overwhelming 0%
4.4.  USA Partnering Research Study Results
The evidence presented in the literature suggests that the trend towards
partnering is advanced in the USA. One of the major champions of partnering
has been the US Army Corp of Engineers. Larson, for example, reports on a
study of 280 partnering projects of varying type and scope from heavy process
engineering through to hospital extensions [122]. Over half of these projects were
awarded to an open, competitive , low-bid process. Larson provides a taxonomy
of relationships based on perceived attitudes of project partners and categorises
the following distribution of projects as:
1. Adversarial: Participants perceive themselves as adversaries with each party
pursuing their own concerns as their prime priority and objective. There were
78 (28%) of these in the sample.
2. Guarded Adversarial: Participants cooperate strictly within the bounds of the
contract. Superiors using the formal interpretation of contractual obligations
resolve major disputes. There were 66 (24%) of these in the sample.
3. Informal Partners: Participants sustain the relationship beyond the boundaries
of the contract. Disputes are resolved through mutual adjustment that at least
partially satisfies both sides. There were 77 (28%) of these in the sample.
4. Project partners: Participants treat each other as equals, on the same team
and working closely together to solve problems and improve processes.
There were 59 (21%) of these in the sample.
Figure 4-5 illustrates Larson's findings. These were Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) results for success criteria (1-5 scale low to high) by owner-contractor
relationship type. They consistently demonstrate a pattern of the higher level of
collaboration and cooperation relationship having higher success ratings than
lower ones. Interestingly, on the issue of low bid performance of the 280 projects,
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142 were awarded on a lowest bid, competitive basis. Of the six success factors
investigated, bid status was an insignificant factor at the 0.05 level of
significance. However, their analysis revealed significant interaction effects at the
0.05 significance levels on the overall results for owner-contractor relationships
for avoiding litigation. For these two factors, non-lowest bid price as opposed to
lowest-bid price, was consistently associated with effectiveness for adversarial,
informal partners and partners, and less effective for guarded adversarial
relations. Refer to the paper for a fuller description of definitions and terms [122].
This indicates that selecting by the lowest tender is less effective that taking a
more comprehensive approach to the project's probable completion cost.
Success  for  Owner -Cont rac tor  Re la t ionsh ip
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ti
m
e
C
o s
t
Te
ch
ni
ca
l
Cu
st
om
er
Li
t ig
at
io
n
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n
Ov
er
all
Success Cr i ter ion
M
e
a
n
 S
u
c
c
e
s
s
 L
e
v
e
l
Adversar ia l  (n=78)
Guarded adversar ia l
(n=66)
Informal parters (n=77)
Partners (n=59)
Total sample
Where Time = meeting schedule; cost = Controlling cost; Technical = Technical performance;
Customer = Meeting customer needs; Litigation = Avoiding litigation; Satisfaction = satisfaction of
participants; Overall = Overall results.
Figure 4-5 Larson Study - Success Factor Results by Relationship Type
(Source: Adapted from Larson [122])
In 1992, a study of US Army Corp of Engineers construction projects found that
31 out of 37 domestic districts used partnering [123]. The survey highlighted 19
partnering projects and used data available for 16 of these (12 civil and 4 military
engineering projects) which represented 85% of projects undertaken using
partnering at that time. Using criteria for success of cost change, change order
cost, claims cost, value engineering savings and duration change, a comparison
of these were made with 28 non-partnering projects using 't' tests. The results
indicate that the mean cost change for partnered projects was 2.72% for
partnered projects and 8.75% for non-partnered projects—an improvement of
6.03% for partnered projects (with a 0.01 'P' value on a two-tailed test indicating
a very high level of statistical reliability). These results showed a similar
difference for reduction in construction time change with a 6.46% mean value but
this was of low statistical reliability. The mean difference between partnering and
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not-partnering projects' contract change costs were 3.89% and 7.74%
respectively—an improvement of 3.85% for partnered projects (with a 0.07 'P'
value on a two-tailed test indicating a very high level of statistical reliability).
When 't' tests were undertaken to test the result at the 90% significance level
both cost and change order (contract variations) criteria indicate significant
improvements through use of partnering. Also none of respondents interviewed
who were involved in partnering projects were dissatisfied with partnering. Their
subjective data analysis revealed that intangible benefit to partnering included:
1. Reduced administrative paperwork;
2. More enjoyable project work environment;
3. Reduced communication barriers; and
4. Less adversarial relationships.
Both studies from data gathered on US Army Corps of Engineers projects
indicate significant gains from the use of partnering . This indicates that higher
quality of cooperation and collaboration pays dividends to the client and parties
concerned. The potential benefit of partnering is illustrated in Figure 4-7 below in
terms of the extent that project objects are aligned through partnering.
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Figure 4-6 The Project Continuum (Source: Thompson & Sanders [124, p74])
Further evidence based upon the USA Construction Industry Institute (CII) study
of partnering experience gathered from 21 partnering relationships involving
more than 30 owners indicates an overwhelmingly positive experience with
partnering and validated the choice to partner [125].  Results are illustrated below
in Table 4-9. The taxonomy proposed closely follows Larson's three evolutionary
stages of the alignment of project objectives illustrated in Figure 4-6 above.
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Table 4-9 CII USA Study Results (Source: Thompson & Sanders [124])
Relationship Characteristics Comments
Competition
(low  objectives
alignment)
1. No common objectives; they may actually conflict
2. Success coming at the expense of others  (win/lose
mentality)
3. Short-term focus
4. No common project measures between organisations
5. Competitive relationship maintained by coercive
environment
6. Little or no continuous improvement
7. Single points of contact between organisations
8. Little trust, with no shared risk; primarily a defensive
position
· Business as usual
Cooperation
(low/medium
objectives
alignment)
1. Common objectives that are project specific
2. Improved personal interpersonal relationships
3. Team members who are likely to be involved in projects
     outside the partnering relationship
4. Partnership measures that may or may not resemble
    organisational measures used on other projects
5. Multiple points of contact
6. Limited trust and shared risk: guarded information sharing
· Schedule reduction
-  10.5%
· Cost reduction -
16.3%
· RFI turnaround
time: 14 days
versus 30-60 days
Collaborative
(medium/high
objectives
alignment)
1. Long-term focus on accomplishing the strategic goals of
    involved parties
2. Multi-project agreement: long-term relationships without
    guaranteed workload
3. Common measurement system for the projects and the
    relationship
4. Improved processes and reduced duplication
5. Relationship-specific measures tied to team incentives
6. Shared authority
7. Openness, honesty, and increased risk sharing
· 40% reduction in
man-hours needed
per project
completion (identical
projects)
· 17% reduction in
staff man/hour/craft
man-hour ratio
· 21% reduction in
staff payroll
expense/craft payroll
expense ratio
· 10% improvement
in worker utilisation
rate
· 10% reduction in
overall project cost
· 100% success in
meeting budget/time
· 50% reduction in
engineering rework
· 50% reduction in
sales expense
Coalescing
(high  objectives
alignment)
1. One common performance measurement system
2. Cooperative relationships supported by collaborative
     experiences and activities
3. Cultures integrated and directed to fit the application
4. Transparent interface
5. Implicit trust and shared risk
· 15% reduction
in equipment and
construction cost
· 33% reduction
in engineering
rates
· 100%
acceptance of risk
by the owner in
exchange for a
low fee charged
by the engineer
Finally in better understanding partnership or alliance options it is worth returning
to the 1996 CIIA  study which provides a model of partnering options that can be
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categorised as experimental partnering, packaged partnering and committed
partnering.
4.5.  Types of Project Partnering - From Cooperation to Coalescence
It is clear from both the Australian and USA case studies and research results
that the partnering systems and their variants provide worthwhile benefit. Tables
4-10 and 4-11 demonstrate the need for the owner/client to be knowledgeable
enough about procurement options to appreciate the importance of:
· defining project goals ;
· identifying resources required to provide the partnering infrastructure;
· knowing how to evaluate potential project partners; and
· understanding relative benefits of different types of relationship arrangements.
Table 4-10 Australian Partnering  Forms (Source: CIIA  [121, p17] )
Partnering
Type
Partnering Description Partnering Outcome
Experimental
Partnering
· Charter, workshop, small number of
follow-up meetings.
· Usually first partnering experience.
· Minimally resourced.
· Often seen as a 'toe-in-the-water'
exercise
· Often unsuccessful, generally
because of lack of clear
understanding, commitment and
structure
Packaged
Partnering
· Offered as part of a contractor's
tender or imposed upon the
contractor after the tender is
accepted
· Often involves only the client and
contractor.
· This model is used very successfully
as a marketing tool.
· Problems may arise from lack of
commitment and understanding of
each stakeholder's objective.
· A client/contractor relationship
perceived to be cooperative at the
outside of a project may not
necessarily last for the duration of
the contract.
Committed
Partnering
· Often developed as a result of first,
unsuccessful experience.
· Incorporates as many stakeholders
as possible in a tight, well
facilitated dispute resolution
mechanism.
· Well resourced
· Problems may arise from lack of
commitment and understanding of
each stakeholder's objective.
· A client/contractor relationship
perceived to be cooperative at the
outside of a project may not
necessarily last for the duration of
the contract.
The critical element of partnering  and alliancing studies indicates that there are
vital components of the relationship that differentiates alliancing from partnering
(section 4.8 explains alliancing in detail)—or at least those more committed levels
of partnering. These elements generally fall into the following categories:
· level of trust and commitment;
· degree to which the relationship is planned and nurtured rather than forced or
required as a condition of contract;
· way in which the relationship is initiated, fostered and maintained as part of
an integrated procurement process;
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· the degree to which transparency/open-book philosophy is maintained; and
· the way in which risk and reward is treated.
Table 4-11 presents a four-level relationship typology that addresses the issue of
dispute resolution methods for different types of partnering arrangements.
Table 4-11 Levels of Partnering and ADR
(Source: Adapted from Ellison & Miller [126, p46])
Level 1 - Adversarial
Arms length
Contractual
Level 2 -
Collaborative
Team-Oriented
Level 3 -
Value-Added
Integrated Team
Level 4 - Synergistic
Strategic
Partnership
· Competition · Cooperation · Collaboration · Coalescence
· Each side has clearly
established
responsibilities
· Client "monitors and
inspects" contractor
· Little or no trust
· Each side knows and
commits to the goals
of the project and to
each other's goals -
requires degree of
trust
· One integrated team
consisting of both
client and contractor
personnel is created
- requires high trust
· This team  has one
set of goals for a
successful project
· Team often creates
a separate
organisational entity
for the life of the
project
· Elements of shared
risk also defined
· joint sharing of
liabilities for project
failure
· joint sharing of gains
from project success
· Both sides share
their goals and cost -
requires extremely
high trust
· Often adversarial
· Often creates
disputes, sometimes
litigation
· Significant energy in
communications and
"win-win" conflict
resolution
· Disputes typically
resolved in some
degree of
compromise and
harmony
· Accountability is
collective among the
integrated team
· Both client and
contractor provide
senior level
"sponsors" to
remove barriers and
support the project
· Curve on benefits is
logarithmic - based
on meeting and then
exceeding project
goals
· The essence of the
relationship is to
increase the mutual
profitability of both
parties
· Neither at the
expense of the other
· Both at creating new
synergistic solutions
· Both sides plagued by
schedule slips and
cost overruns
· established for early
positive intervention
· Projects often
accomplished on
schedule and within
budget
· Typically includes
some incentive for
exceeding project
goals
· Requires extensive
communication,
collaboration and
organisational
commitment and
sponsorship
· Creates the
opportunities for
major breakthrough
Much of the partnering  rhetoric can be manipulative, indeed in many of the
studies cited in this section there were cautionary comments about clients or
contractors that use the guise of partnering as a means of taking unfair
advantage of those required to form a partnering arrangement. In Australia both
Kwok [59] and Lenard et al [121] cite commercial disadvantage as principal
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causes of these types of relationship failure. Clients who enforce a partnering
arrangement after tender award may be courting problems. As relationships edge
towards Levels 3 and 4, specific plans and procedures are put in place to
develop and maintain an atmosphere of trust. This can be contrasted with the
Levels 1 and 2 environment in which disputes can be resolved amicably without
the usual levels of hostility, gamesmanship, posturing, and generally responding
with ambit claims.  With the Level 3 approach, there should be evidence of a
paradigm shift from project participants seeing themselves as being in separate
teams to being groups who are part of a single project team.
Table 4-12 illustrates how developing a partnership relationship has been
categorised as a five-phase process at the Level 3 Partnering Relationship. It is
important to stress that parties should be planning for expected success and
rather than potential or inevitable failure. Also, active support from senior level
management is essential for the relationship success.
Table 4-12 Developing a Partnership Relationship
(Source: Ellison & Miller [126, p46-47])
Phase Actions
1 Needs Analysis · Describing the current status of the project
· Defining the roles of key participants
· Defining potential opportunities and liabilities
· Developing a framework including guidelines or criteria for the work
2. Partnership
Structure and Scope
· Identifying the core structure
· Naming the principal contacts
· Establishing a charter with mission goals, and objectives: roles,
responsibilities, and formal authority; and incentives to meet and
exceed goals.
3. Relationship With
Other Stakeholders
· Defining the roles of major subcontractors, outside agencies,
community organisations, decision makers
· Identifying the means to minimise disputes and to build compromise
solutions
4. Sharing
Risk/Rewards
· Identifying contractual issues and defining the relationship among the
various stakeholders
· Establishing the tools for both measurement and sharing of liabilities
· Defining the incentives for measurement and sharing gains/liabilities
5. Continuous
Improvement
· Joint assessment of progress
· Evaluation of changing needs and expectations
· Analysis and application of lessons learned
· Prescribing actions to respond to changes, correct course, and seize
opportunities
4.6.  Requirements for Level 4 - Synergistic Strategic Partnerships
Figure 4-7 provides an illustration of the requirements of such high level
partnerships and the business relationship maturity and sophistication needed. In
this model, four clusters of factors and two sets of processes contribute to a high
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level of maturity and readiness to abandon the short-term view of a vendor and
reach beyond the limitations of the supplier mentality.
Partnerships
• Mutually rewarding, strong, long-term
  relationship based on a two-way
  trust, commitment and cooperation
• World-class companies
• World-class products
• World-class services
PARTNERING PROCESS
PARTNERING MANAGERTECHNOLOGY
PROCESS CAPACITY
Workplace Reform
• Enterprise agreements
• Restructuring
• Productivity gains
• Upskilling/multiskilling
• Ownership
• Empowerment
• Attitude/cultural change
Total Quality
• Accreditation
• TQM/SPC
• Teamwork
• Attitude/culture change
• Quality up
• Costs down
• Internal customers
   and suppliers
Management
• Leadership
• Vision
• Strategy
• Active participation
• Support
External customers
   and suppliers
• $/ROI large
• Strategic fit
• Shared information +
   vision
• Trust
• World-class, or
  potential to be
Figure 4-7 Strategic Partnering Requirements (Source: Lendrum [117, p23] )
One interesting feature of the model is the workplace reform element. Strategic
partnering/alliancing requires a number of workplace infrastructure elements to
be in place before it can be successfully developed. These are underpinned by a
quality management focus. Workplace reform measures and total quality
management (TQM) philosophy for excellence facilitate the liberation of creative
energy of the workforce and technicians undertaking hands-on project work. So
quality management needs to support continuous improvement, innovation and
breakthrough invention. This requires an attitudes and values cultural
infrastructure to facilitate high level performance including nurturing by a
management environment and leadership characteristic that allows creative
energies to flow. The theoretical basis for this requirement was extensively
discussed in Chapter 3. This concentrates on workplace and management
flexibility. It aspires to more than maintaining multiskilling to achieve lower costs
but strives beyond this empowering workers to develop their skills so that they
can offer advice on developing and implementing innovative processes and
product improvement that contributes to breakthrough innovations/inventions.
This model is based upon a paradigm shift from an us-and-them approach to
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firm-internal partnership where gains are shared and increases in productivity
rewarded.
An infrastructure of external suppliers and a client that understands support
infrastructure requirements for this level of partnering is also needed.  There
needs to be a focus on external customers in the supply chain with trust and
commitment and world-class practice standards prevailing. Supply chain
management for value and the intertwining of customers, suppliers and
subcontractors is well advanced in the automotive, aerospace and other
manufacturing sectors [16, 89, 115, 127]. Thus, there is a need for sophisticated
clients, suppliers and subcontractors as well as sophisticated project managers
that can optimise the supply chain as well as managing the alliance relationship.
This requires high level technical/process and human relations skills.
There also needs to be an underpinning technology infrastructure to enhance
communication, planning and decision-making, and to support control of the
project—using the advantage of flexibility of action through the support of the
technology infrastructure. The Internet is proving to be a significant enabler for
electronic communications with electronic data interchange (EDI) to allow just-in-
time supply for not only physical products but for information products. Extranets,
for example using web-based systems are useful for sharing design development
information and more mundane but essential information such as requests for
information (RFIs)  [128].
The management process requires a high level of partnering management to
create and sustain partnering/alliance relationships. Earlier sections in this
chapter detailed results of empirical studies supporting this view. Partnership
management and leadership practices need to support a partnerships or
alliances.  Figure 4-7 represents a considerable paradigm shift for most
industries—the construction industry is no exception—where shifting away from
selecting the cheapest tender to a criterion of best-value. Calls for this shift is
growing in many countries [9, 13, 15, 129, 130].
4.7.  Reasons For Embarking on Level 4 - Synergistic Strategic
Partnerships
Drago, in evaluating strategic alliances in the USA IT industry states that  "…The
roles of each partner must be understood and actions taken through the alliance
must be managed and monitored to the satisfaction of all parties. This, in turn,
can require considerable time and effort from managers within the organisations
of the alliance…  each partner must give up some flexibility over that part of its
domain to reduce either external or internal uncertainty". He also offers
observations for the IT industry on why strategic alliances make sense [131]. This
has particular relevance to construction industry suppliers and subcontractors
because they tend to be at the end of queue in terms of influencing designers
and the client.  Further, they have much to offer in innovative potential but often
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they fail to grasp opportunities to convince clients or the design teams of the
merits of their propositions. Project partnering and alliancing provide the potential
for such opportunities. Drago's observations follow:
1. Small organisations are more likely to enjoy strategic alliances benefits than
larger ones—due to their lack of resources to 'go it alone', less access to
knowledge, and experience less influence over their competitive environment;
2. Organisations competing in highly innovative industries or industrial segments
gain greater benefit than others—through achieving greater access to
customers and increased ability to create the 'rules of the game';
3. Firms producing component parts for larger technological systems can both
reduce uncertainty for product specialisation and increasing their influence
with product design decision-makers;
4. Firms competing with 'pure' innovation strategies are more likely to enjoy
benefits that those with 'limited' innovation—due to greater market uncertainty
in developing and bringing innovations  to market;
5. Firms with goals of becoming 'technology sponsors' are likely to enjoy
significant benefits through alliancing—through having the opportunity to
develop industry default standards on their own terms thus reducing
uncertainty rather than having an open system of giving away intellectual
property to influence accepted standards;
6. Firms entering new markets are more likely to enjoy benefits—by spreading
risks for greater market and operational uncertainty;
7. Firms that generally suffer from a lack of critical resources can partially
overcome this constraint—due to sharing resources with others to mutual
advantage, for example R+D facilities, key staff, training facilities etc.
Full alliancing (level 4 strategic Partnerships) with its selection process first
based on a service criteria then on price consideration as a second order issue
(in the assumption that best value  will follow) has its sceptics. In a recent article
in Building Australia reporting upon a seminar by KPMG undertaken on project
alliancing, the NSW Auditor-General is quoted as stating that from the NSW
Government's point of view, it has to justify projects on the basis of cost. "If, as in
project alliancing, you enter a project and don't know the cost or do not have the
capacity to manage the risk of cost blowouts, it would be hard, as a government
agency, to justify the decision to undertake the project on such a delivery method"
[132, p37].  Pre-qualification issues are nevertheless seen as vitally important for
those with alliancing experience. Eric Kolatchew7, is quoted as saying that "an
intense review needs to be carried out of the pre-qualification organisations, taking
into account the way they operate, previous jobs, the opinions of past and present
clients and compatibility of the key personnel proposed" [132, p35].
Many of the alliancing projects recently reported upon have featured an
innovative pricing and cost structure methodology which is a radical departure
from the business as usual case that has attracted so much criticism. It exhibits
                                                
7 Project Director for the BHP Port Hedland HBI project—judged an unsuccessful alliance project.
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and demonstrates a radical paradigm shift in owner's attitudes. In the traditional
procurement as well as alternative forms discussed earlier, the owner/client
clearly sees project delivery in product terms. A price is determined for the end
product—the project. Even in many forms of partnering, the output is seen as a
finished product. The exciting change in perception of alliancing is that
professionals centre the contractual focus on service delivery, which delivers both
product and knowledge. The theory behind this paradigm shift is that creative
knowledgeable professionals when brought together in a synergistic environment
will create innovative or breakthrough solutions that deliver better value for money
than a lowest-cost design and constructed solution. Additionally, the creative
process will not only enhance the project's delivery solution but also deliver new
techniques, knowledge and practice to the industry. Thus, the client/owner gains
from this process—organisations exposed to this process gain both organisational
and personal knowledge for those involved and the industry in general gains.
4.8.  Developing a Strategic Alliance Relationship
A continuum of partnering relationships was introduced in Tables 4-10 and 4-11.
It can be appreciated that this continuum is a function of the degree of joint rather
than shared commitment of parties undertaking a project.  In non-partnering or
non-alliancing arrangements, parties may share a commitment to project goals.
Indeed on most projects there is an incentive for teams to work together to
achieve project success. Under those arrangements, and indeed under
partnering, one team may 'sink or swim' without necessarily affecting the
business position of other teams. One team may make profits from a project
while other partnered firms/teams may actually make a financial loss.
With alliancing, there is a joint rather than shared commitment. Parties agree
their contribution levels and required profit beforehand and then place these at
risk. If one party in the alliance under-performs then all other alliance partners are
at risk of losing their rewards (profit and incentives) and could even share losses
according to the agreed project painsharing/gainsharing model. Thus, alliance
members form a quasi-joint venture because they operate at one level as a
single entity, however, they do not merge their companies in any legal or official
way. They remain truly independent companies but they must help each other
satisfy key performance idicators (KPIs) to realise the rewards at risk. This
provides a powerful incentive to achieve projects goals—indeed to perform
beyond expectations where incentive schemes encourage them to do so.
The important distinction between partnering and alliancing is that with partnering
aims and goals are agreed upon and dispute resolution and escalation plans are
established but partners still retain independence and may individually suffer or
gain from the relationship. With alliancing the alliance parties form a cohesive
entity, that jointly shares risks and rewards to an agreed formula. Thus if the
project is fails to meet agreed project KPIs then all partners jointly share the
agreed penalty. Rewards are likewise bestowed for successfully exceeding
expectations. Risk and reward issue are pivotal in providing immediate monetary
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or financial motivation to meet or exceed KPI's on alliancing projects. Several
variations on a consistent model are evident from the literature [9, 10] and are
illustrated in Figure 4-8.
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Figure 4-8 Model of Painsharing/Gainsharing
(Source: Australian Construction Association [10, p19])
In one case of an alliancing project, the Australian National Museum, the project
budget the project partners developed the project budget based on a cost plus
formula of construction costs plus project preliminaries and a corporate profit
margin. Budgeted profit was based upon profit levels over several years past plus
an agreed bonus level. Past profit levels were independently audited. The
preliminaries and profit margin were then placed at risk subject to acceptable
project performance. The project budget process involved developing rigorous
and challenging key KPIs. If these are met then the actual construction cost plus
agreed overhead and profit levels will be paid to alliance partners. If KPIs are
exceeded the alliance team shares a bonus based upon a predetermined agreed
formula [8]. This arrangement is similar other alliancing projects for example the
Wandoo gas field project [9, Appendix 2, 132, p34]. This is an interesting
approach as it encourages different alliance partners to help each other achieve
the KPIs and when problems in achieving these become evident there is a group
incentive to collaboratively work towards obviating problems to overcome the
problem and achieve or exceed the KPI.
Strategic alliances are effective when partner selection is based upon a world
class product or service [117]. The alliance partners selected for the Australian
National Museum project was based on their expertise and ability to meet stringent
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performance criteria before price issues were considered. The successful alliance
was required to demonstrate itself to be a trustworthy, committed and world-class
group of professionally competent firms. They were then invited to join with the
owner/client  to develop the project. In doing so they formed an alliance of talented
professionals, pooling resources to achieve the project goals. This alliance then
fully developed a project price target through design development and agreed upon
the agreed risk and reward sharing arrangements. The client ensured value for
money by independently verifying the project estimate. Expected cost savings were
derived from improved value for money being obtained through leverage of skills
and expertise of the alliance partners in developing the project concept through to
delivery.  Life cycle cost considerations and value engineering exercises also
featured as cost management techniques applied.
Strategic alliancing requires top level commitment and a management structure
in place where a senior manager accepts responsibility and commitment to not
only develop the necessary alliance relationships but to maintain them [9, 10,
117, 121, 125]. The alliancing manager needs to act with integrity to engender
trust and openness so that issues can be brought out into the open, investigated
rationally without intimidation, and that parties feel that they are not likely to be
exploited or manipulated. Alliances are more focussed in ensuring that all allied
companies perform than is the case with partnering arrangements. The typology
of relationship maintenance in Table 4-13 provides useful guidance here.
Teams of people ensure that project goals are realised—that is why the alliance
arrangement requires the paradigm shift illustrated in Figure 4-7. Therefore, there
is a need for a program of workplace reform that ensures removal of barriers that
inhibit individuals from working co-operatively. Workplace agreements, for
example, should enable and support flexibility of job roles. Thus, skills, training
and wider task responsibility and innovation support processes can challenge
more rigid industrial award provisions and expectations [117, p22]. Building solid
relationships with all members of the supply chain, from supplier through to client,
is important to strategic alliancing because there are many synergies that can be
capitalised upon—such as sharing administration systems that ensure IT
compatibility aids communication effectiveness. Sharing information more
broadly about customer needs, feedback from parts of the supply chain together
with creative ideas are a key feature of strategic alliancing  [89].
Alliancing is highly strategic, connecting the activities of world-class operators
with complementary skills to not only manage risk, but also encourage and
develop incremental improvement through both innovation and breakthrough
inventiveness. The way in which networks of firms come together and ways they
interact provide both added value and value for money to the client—this
replaces cheapest capital cost as a prime objective.
An important aspect of the partnering  or strategic alliance philosophy is
innovation, capture of knowledge and lessons learned. Innovation has been
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identified as a critical need for today's construction industry [133-135]. Similarly,
the need for procurement systems to target organisational learning and
knowledge as a project output has also been proposed elsewhere [63, 64, 136]
and more generally for other industries [81, 82, 109, 115, 137-142].
Lendrum advances a mode, illustrated in Figure 4-9 below, of creating effective
alliance partnerships. This model illustrates how creating an effective alliance can
be instigated to achieve 12 motivators identified in Figure 4-3.
MOTIVATORS
Will the next step? ...
1.   Add value
2.   Reduce costs
3.   Improve communication
4.   Develop trust
5.   Resolve conflicts
6.   Remove hidden agendas
7.   Provide leadership
8.   Empower people
9.   Gain commitment
10.  Develop ownership
11.  Break down departmental
      barriers
12. Remove fear
      (internal and/or External)
 Select partner
 Review internal 
relationships
Review partnership
process with partner
and share information
Requirements
analysis (present
and future)
Meet requirements
In full on time A1 spec.
    - Quick fix
    - Quality solutions
Select/review 
       partnering teamCustomer/supplier
     site visits
Customer/supplier
     skills requirements
(review/implement)
Review supplier
     relationships
 upstream
Technology
requirements
(current+future)
Review inter-
and  intra-partner
networks
  Develop/
implement/review
strategy/action plan
Figure 4-9 Creating Effective Alliance Partnerships (Source: Lendrum [117,
p123])
A matrix of key selection criteria for potential alliances should be prepared before
selection takes place. The Australian National Museum project is a prime
example of this process. The following 12 criteria were prepared to assist
selection of the project alliance. Potential alliance partners were required to
respond to these by demonstrating, through citing evidence from past projects,
their attainment level for these criteria.
1. Demonstrated ability to complete the full scope of works including contributing
to building, structural mechanical and landscaping design. The focus was on
proof of performance on complex projects similar to the Australian National
Museum project where the proponents had actively contributed to a design
process to improve project outcomes. At least 3 examples of buildability or
constructability were requested as evidence.
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2. Demonstrated ability to minimise project capital and operating costs without
sacrificing quality. At least 10 examples were requested of projects brought
within or below budget demonstrating evidence of understanding of life cycle
costs. Value analysis would be appropriate technique to have been used here
to demonstrate life cycle costs savings as well as smarter ways of achieving a
quality outcome.
3. Demonstrated ability to achieve outstanding quality results. A minimum of 3
examples of what was considered to be of outstanding quality was required.
Testimonials, industry and professional association awards provide suitable
evidence supplemented by a formal presentation with photographs and/or
other clear forms of evidence to convey quality performance.
4. Demonstrated ability to provide the necessary resources for the project and
meet the project program. At least 3 projects greater than A$50million were
required to used to demonstrate this capacity. The organisation chart and CV
of key staff was also used as a source of evidence together with mobilisation
plans and global method statements of how the work was planned and
organised.  A financial capacity (assessed by the client nominated auditor)
requirement was necessary to ensure that only financially sound and capable
partners would be selected. Financial systems used by the alliance partners
was also an issue—to ensure that they meet requirements of an open-book
approach and a capacity for transparency to the auditors.
5. Demonstrated ability to add value and bring innovation to the project. At least
3 examples were required of process improvement introduced over the past 3
years. This required a demonstrated commitment to continuous improvement,
innovation and/or breakthrough invention.
6. Demonstrated ability to achieve outstanding safety performance. This
required at least an example of a past safety plan from a previous project and
presentation of supporting data such as lost claims/million man hours over the
past 3 years, corporate occupational health and safety (OHS) policy and how
this policy was translated into action.
7. Demonstrated ability to achieve outstanding workplace relations. At least 3
years of data and statistics of performance on disputes and how they were
managed. Corporate workplace policy and action plans and evidence of the
nature and experience of workplace agreements over the past 3 years.
8. Successful public relations (PR) and industry recognition. At least 3 examples
of successful PR and industry recognition from previous projects such as
proactive community involvement, previous track record of managing
community expectations and credible stakeholder involvement. Examples of
where a PR disaster may have been turned around.
9. Demonstrated practical experience and philosophical approach in the areas of
developing ecologically sustainability and environmental management. A
minimum of 1 environmental management system (EMS) plan developed and
implemented was required. There was also a focus on nominated people
having good understanding, experience, and qualifications to formulate and
manage EMS plans.
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10. Demonstrated understanding and affinity for operating as a member of an
alliance. Each of the participating companies were required to provide
examples of working in a non-adversarial and collaborative manner as well as
to demonstrate their views on participating on risk/reward schemes. The
willingness to wholeheartedly support and embrace the alliance philosophy
was required. There was a focus on ideas, team working and sound past
relationships and general knowledge about the alliancing  concept.
11. Substantial acceptance of the draft alliance documented for the project
including related codes of practice, proposals for support of local industry
development, employment opportunities for Australian indigenous peoples.
There was a focus on outstanding record of working with government, local
communities and accepting broader responsibility for an ethical and socially
responsible manner of working.
12. Demonstrated commitment to exceed the project objectives. This required a
demonstration that the proposed alliance partnership were truly committed to
the project ethos with highest level corporate championing and an
understanding of the calibre and qualities that differentiated the project needs
from a business-as-usual case where conflict and adversarial actions prevail.
Several of the points clearly relate to traditional project management excellence
criteria, quality cost and time. It is interesting that the criteria for Australian
National Museum project include KPIs  that relate to the 'triple bottom line', which
has been offered as the future direction for responsible corporate governance.
The triple bottom line includes reporting on KPIs related to environmental and
community stakeholders as well as financial performance [7, 11]. The above
criteria move beyond the limited measures for traditional project management
success to a broader model of excellence.
The above has shown that considerable attention is required in choosing an
alliance partner. There is an urgent need to confront and address the critical 'soft'
management issues such as alliance relationship quality as well as some of the
more traditional performance measures noted within the 12 point criteria for the
Australian National Museum project. The significant differences between project
alliancing and partnering is the determination of the successful team is based
upon:
· demonstrated performance ability rather than price;
· the budget being only finalised after the alliance team is appointed;
· the risk/reward structure being similarly determined only after selection of
the alliance team;
· the alliancing principles being part of the contract; and
· the operational phase of the project involves open-book accounting with a
shared risk and reward formula being applied.
Most partnering  and alliance literature stresses the importance of selection of
suitable partners. It is usual to shortlist these from a group of potential alliance
partners (based on a set of selection criteria such as the Australian National
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Museum project 12 point criteria) and to only interview one or two alliance
groups. Figure 4-10 illustrates the alliancing selection process.
1-  Invite 
Proposals
2 - Receive 
Proposals
3 - Assess Capabilities
and Suitability & 
Commitment 
to Alliancing
4 - Shortlist
Proponents
(Maximum 5
desirable)
5 - Conduct Interviews
to Consider in Detail:
• Capabilities
• Suitability &
  Commitment to
  Alliancing
6 - Reduce List of
Proponents (Maximum
Two desirable)
7 - Two-day Workshop 
with Each Proponent 
to Establish:
• Alliance Principles
• Commitment to 
   outstanding results
• Alliance Board
• Project Management Team
8 - Determine Preferred
Alliance Team of 
Consultants and
Contractors
9 - Establish With Preferred
Alliance  Team :
• Final Alliance Agreement
• Risk/Reward Curves
• Direct Cost Criteria
• Target Cost (Client’s
  Discretion)
10 - Approve
 Preferred
Alliance Team
11 - Execute
Alliance 
Agreement
Figure 4-10 Alliancing Selection Process (Source: adapted from KPMG [9, p25] )
This is a radical departure from other forms of procurement—despite its similarity
to cost plus or on-call multi-task contacting. One of the more tangible outputs
from the initial stages of team establishment is the final alliance agreement. This
is very similar to a partnering charter. The aim is to specify the goals and values
that will govern the relationship between participants. Lenard et al cautions
against a charter being drafted in a way that conflicts with contracts between
parties. In the CIIA study 86% of participants involved in failed partnering
relationships cited a conflict between the partnering charter and work contracts
[121, p21]. Partnering agreements and strategic alliance charters flow from an
agreed set of principles arising out of the partnering workshop.
Figure 4-10 illustrates in step 7 in the flow diagram the two-day workshop in
which an independent facilitator helps the client and other participants develop
the set of principles that will provide the underlying work culture that will define
the project's team working environment. The preferred alliance team will emerge
and this team together with other consultants and/or contractors that are brought
together in the alliance will establish an alliance board, project management team
and develop measures to be used to gauge commitment and quantify required
results. This method is very similar to that described for a project in the UK
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developed by a management contracting organisation with subcontractors and
suppliers in which final pricing was agreed at the end of the process [143]. KPMG
recommends that "the workshop be used to provide the client with the
opportunity to gauge the suitability of the contending teams to successfully work
together in an alliance environment to see whether:
· The client believes that the team can be trusted;
· The teams have people with the right leadership and culture;
· There are any weak links within any of the team;
· The individuals have a proper appreciation of the project; and
· There is enthusiasm for the concept of alliancing" [9, p27].
Once the alliance team is selected, it will agree target costs for the project and
the gainshare/painshare formula with the client. The client will generally be
advised by external consultants to ensure that probity and value for money is
maintained. The difference between partnering and alliancing  is evident at this
stage because typically partnering agreements are established and negotiated
after individual project partners have tendered or negotiated their separate
contracts [122]. The purpose of the partnering agreement is to establish a non-
adversarial and generally civilised way of working together to achieve mutually
agreed project goals . Thus, the partnering charter determines an organisational
culture and determines the relationship climate or framework within which the
project team will work. Typically, escalation paths for dispute resolution are
established to enable disputes that are unable to be resolved at one level of
management to be escalated upwards through the firm's hierarchy so that it can
be resolved without having to resort to legal action taking place [40, 121-124].
With strategic alliances, the alliance takes group responsibility for developing the
project costs and maintaining that cost or even improving upon it. Disputes and
disagreements are treated in a similar manner to partnering but the added
incentive of alliance partners' sharing gain or pain, as a group is more effective—
see Figure 4-8 for an example. It is in the interest of all alliance parties to help a
struggling member perform at a high standard in order that all may share in any
bonus. It is an all or nothing case that encourages genuine cooperation.
The Australian National Museum project alliance charter provides a good
example of what might be agreed upon by alliance partners.
"This Alliance will create an exceptional Australian cultural precinct
on Acton Peninsular, Canberra. The Project is the flagship for the
Century of Federation and will be a source of pride for all Australians.
The way we go about it will lead the way for construction projects in
the future. We are therefore committed to the following principles.
We are committed to:
· To continually strive for innovation and breakthroughs;
· Honest, open and ethical communications and actions;
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· Timely and forthright resolution of all issues;
· Equitable risk and reward;
· Public accountability and good governance;
· A culture of responsibility;
· Listening with intensity and speaking with responsibility;
· Supporting all team members;
· Collective ownership of decisions;
· Trust, integrity and respect; and
· Achieving a Balanced Quality of Life".
It is interesting that the above agreement should encompass aspects of
community values and in particular the balanced quality of life issue. These are
part of the concepts expressed in an emerging movement for companies to aim
beyond maximising the financial bottom line by creating value for shareholders.
The triple bottom line concept aims for firms to also achieve sustainability and
social responsibility measures of success [7]. The alliance charter and the 12
selection criteria listed earlier indicate a conscious pursuit of a broader agenda
for success. It is also interesting that the Australia Commonwealth Government,
by instigating the Australian National Museum project using an alliancing delivery
mechanism, also fully accepts the right for companies to make reasonable and
normal profit from their involvement in the project. The alliance reward system
allows for normal corporate profit to be paid on the open-book cost reporting of
project costs and site management overheads for achievement of project cost
and quality targets with added rewards for exceeding these targets.
4.9.  Sustaining a Strategic  Alliance Relationship
As competing transforms into coalesce of the relationship development process,
a fully developed partnership maintenance program needs to be developed with
the most senior level of management support.
The importance of each of the elements of a strategic alliance and its initial
development as well as its maintenance has been briefly outlined above. It is
important to understand that much of the alliancing concept revolves around
alliance partners as a group collectively taking responsibility for the success or
otherwise of a project. This is manifested through a shared risk and reward
system predicated upon a 'no dispute' philosophy where firms use their energies
by working together to solve problems rather than attributing blame.
This feature of parties agreeing not to sue each other as a means of settling
differences of opinion has raised concerns [9, 70]. There is significant doubt
about the legitimacy of requiring one party to sign away their right to legal
redress. Generally, in partnering/alliance arrangements such as the above, only
in the event of 'wilful default' does a party have an express legal cause of action
against another participant under the terms of the agreement. Typically wilful
default is defined as:
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"A deliberate or intentional failure by a participant (or a director, employee, officer
or subcontractor of a participant) to:
(A) perform a legal or contractual duty; or
(B) take proper action when such action is required,
having regard to what is reasonable in all circumstances and the failure is
persisted in with reckless disregard as to the likely consequences of such failure;
but such wilful default does not include:
· an honest mistake;
· mere oversight, inadvertence or error of judgement; or
· an accidental, involuntary or negligent act or omission,
made in good faith by a participant (or a director, employee, officer or
subcontractor of a participant)" [9, p33].  Clearly, trust and transparency are key
issues that need constant attention to ensure effective relationship maintenance.
Trust is enhanced by an open book philosophy whereby partners and the client
representatives have total access to inspect any partner's costs, time,
occupational health and safety (OH+S), quality and other project information.
This helps to clarify and support 'facts', to facilitate cooperation and open
communication and joint problem solving.  Alliances, and indeed all partnering-
type relationships, need to understand the nature and quality of their internal
communication systems to determine whether the organisation has what it takes
to develop and maintain customer/supplier partnerships. Using a technique of
mapping models similar to Figure 4-11 can assist in identifying potential
relationship problems and trigger the development and operation of relationship
maintenance plans. .
A
B
C
D
E
F
Groups A B C D E F
A disaster !
Needs improvement !
Works well !
A bit of a gamble !
Process:
1 Draw up map (as above)
2 Involve a valid sample sized group to map relationships
3 Share information results widely to test and to action response
4 Work on understanding WHY the results are so - research!
5 Work on deep and rich research to understand fundamentals
    such as trust, loyalty, commitment, barriers and drivers etc.
r :
 r    ( s v )
 I v lv   v li  s l  siz  r  t   r l ti s i s
 r  i f r ti  r s lts i ly t  t st  t  cti  r s s
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Figure 4-11 Relationship Mapping (Source: adapted from Lendrum [117] )
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Mapping not only the relationships between alliance partners but documenting
the quality of their relationships facilitates the establishment of targets. It also
serves to assist monitoring relationship maintenance plans and improving them.
It is clear from the above map that there are groups with strained and fragile
relationships. The next step that an alliance would take after an audit revealing
this kind of result would be to further investigate the drivers and inhibitors of the
recorded situation to develop plans and actions remedying the situation. Often
this involves numerous follow-up workshops undertaken throughout the project
delivery phase. Other team-building measures may be also considered.
Managing alliance relationships to maintain creative energies released through
the alliance formation is a crucial task of alliance's team leaders.
4.10.  Case Studies in Project Alliancing
The concept of strategic alliances has been operating for several decades in the
manufacturing industry. The automotive industry provides the first glimpses of
how they might function. Generally, the major shift from a procurement system in
which many hundreds if not thousands of suppliers and subcontractors are used
to produce an end product for a particular project has been well reported [16].
Other industries such as the aerospace industry, the air service providers and the
electronics industries have provided well documented case studies for analysis
[89, 115, 127]. Moreover, a wide range of providers of services and products has
formed strategic alliances [118, 119]. Few global examples of these occur in the
construction industry, which appears slow in grasping opportunities offered
through strategic alliances. Strategic partnering has however, been a feature of
the construction industry long enough to be able to report on case studies and to
comment on their implementation. It is useful to include both partnering and
alliancing together in this exercise because a core element of both of these is
trust and commitment as well as a well formulated and agreed method of
resolving differences in opinions and direction and resolving disputes.
The CII in the USA has proved a useful vehicle for project partnering relationship
investigations.  Table 4.10 summarised and commented upon one set of findings
[124, 125]. Examples of similar studies of the US Army Corps of Engineers
involved 19 partnering projects [123] with another study of partnering reporting on
280 construction projects [122] as discussed earlier. Interesting insights gained
from these have been commented upon earlier (see Figure 4.5 and Table 4.9).
Australian case studies were also reported upon with detailed commentary on
results presented from a CIIA  study of 32 Australian projects [121].
Each of the above confirmed and highlighted the benefits to be derived from
improving the working relationship of project team members, including the client
representatives.  Each study highlighted the need for trust and commitment with
agreement on project goals and civilised resolution mechanisms for disputes and
disagreements. Inspection of the web sites of several companies widely reported to
have strategic alliances or strategic partnering relationships with clients reveals that
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at least one example from the USA (http://www.bechtel.com/aboutbech/partners.html), and
the UK (http://www.bovis.com/Services/srvAlliances.asp?ServiceID=Alliances),     
Studies of alliancing projects were also reported upon. The ADR continuum was
presented as levels of partnering and again this was based upon case study work
of the US Corps of Engineers experience [126]. The Australian study conducted of
alliancing with the Queensland Government was also reported upon [59, 130]. The
KPMG report to the Government of New South Wales [9] also provides useful
insights in the concept and practice of alliancing in Australia. The experience of
BOOT projects is also of value as BOOT partners undertake a relationship-based
approach in forming the BOOT consortium that uses many of the features of
partnering and alliancing in forming the project delivery entity. Shepherd draws
interesting parallels between BOOT projects (referring to them as public/private
partnership projects) and alliances. In citing the Melbourne City Link projects he
suggests that alliancing principles may be applied in the selection of those
delivering BOOT projects [144].
The literature cited in this book suggests that partnering  has been successfully
used on civil and process engineering projects as well as general building
projects. The evidence on project alliances indicates that while an increasing
number of engineering projects have been completed, the approach has not
been attempted for general construction other than the Australian National
Museum project. A study of contracting relationships and competitive advantage
in public sector projects in Queensland [59] appears from the data presented to
more closely resemble strategic partnering rather than strategic alliancing as it is
now more generally being understood [49]. The distinction between advanced
level or synergistic strategic partnering [126], coalescence as opposed to
collaboration [124] and strategic partnerships as described by Lendrum [117]
provides a blurring between partnering and alliancing that is often confusing.
The report provided by KPMG [9] provides a more useful distinction between
partnering and alliancing. The key distinction appears to be the way in which the
client undertakes the alliance selection process. In alliancing, the client seeks a
contract for services between the client and the provider on the basis of selection
by proven performance against stringent performance criteria followed by
development of committed cost limits and gainsharing/painsharing formula to
ensure value for money [9].  Using this distinction, the Australian National
Museum project would appear to be the first alliancing building construction
project to be undertaken in Australia, possibly the world during the 20th century.
There are no building construction case studies that can be used to compare
project performance with the Australian National Museum project. There are,
however, several engineering projects that have been undertaken using
alliancing principles and practices. These will be briefly described and
commented upon to help illustrate the nature and experiences of alliancing that
can help us better understand how alliancing can function.
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4.10.1. Wandoo B Offshore Oil Platform - Western Australia
(Sources: KPMG & Australian Construction Association  [9, 10])
The oil and gas industry has a history of recognising the advantages of strategic
alliances [89]. Ampolex, Brown & Root, Keppel Fels, Leighton Contractors, and
Ove Arup & Partners formed an alliance to develop a West Australian offshore oil
field located in 55 metres of water. It was a complex project with engineering,
construction and development uncertainties to overcome. There appears to have
been a need for very rapid deployment of a project team to develop the field.
There was also a group of companies, including Ampolex, evidently prepared to
take on the risk of undertaking the project on an alliance basis.
Each participant had valuable knowledge and expertise to contribute in finding an
intelligent win-win solution to the problem of rapid development of the oil field.
Sanction and stretch targets plus a gainshare plan were developed. Stretch
targets are intentionally difficult and demanding targets set to challenge team
participants develop innovative ways in which to achieve objectives. The purpose
is not simply to make participants work harder or longer hours but to develop
innovate of inventive ways of achieving these targets.
The final gainshare of A$16 million proportions were agreed as Ampolex (50%),
Brown & Root (20%), Leighton Contractors (16%), Keppel Fels (12%), and Ove
Arup & Partners (2%). The project was designed, constructed and commissioned
in 26.5 months (against an industry norm of 34 months) with a sanction target
cost of A$377 million, stretch target of A$305 million and actual cost of A$364
million. Safety was not compromised and it is interesting that the sanction target
of no Class 1 injuries was met.
The main rationale for alliancing was that a small team could effectively deliver
the project at world-class standards of performance, very quickly with
enthusiasm. The client and client representative were sophisticated and also able
to demand and verify world-class standards of project delivery. The project was
able to deliver an environment where innovation and excellence prospered. All
parties were expected to benefit. In the event, the alliancing arrangement
delivered above expectation and benefits were shared accordingly. This project
proved to deliver a project under budget to all quality and performance
expectations. It achieved this in a faster than expected duration in a win-win
atmosphere of collegiate representation on a Project Alliance Board. This board
was able to sanction decisions within a framework of trust and commitment
without exploitation by one party over another.
4.10.2. The Andrew Drilling Platform Project - North Sea UK
(Source: KPMG [9] )
This project provided a model for Wandoo B to follow. The project began its
existence in 1990 with a focus on ensuring project viability in a deteriorating
business environment for oil extraction in the UK North Sea oil and gas fields.
The challenge was to deliver a cost effective  oil platform. Over the course of
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1991 the conceptual platform design was defined and developed in cooperation
with a leading engineering contractor at an estimated cost of £450 million—too
high to be commercially viable for the oil field.
The challenge was to find a way of delivering the project to British Petroleum
(BP) at a cost that could be sanctioned and still be profitable for those concerned
in delivering the project. The approach was to develop a set of 10 minimum
conditions of satisfaction (MCOS) against which to judge prospective companies
offering proposals for the design and delivery of platform facilities and subsea
hardware and pipelines. These extended the usual high levels of technical
competence to include relationship factors now more readily recognisable as
alliance relationship requirements. The tender document was brief (50 pages)
requesting performance rather than prescriptive delivery of BP-stated
engineering solutions. Brown and Root identified potential capital savings of at
least 20% and was able to stipulate its own satisfaction requirements for
negotiation. At the end of 1992, Brown and Root proposals were successful
(based upon the 10 MCOS alone) and did not include a financial evaluation for
the Andrew's topsides, jacket and subsea design, plus procurement and project
management support. This was to define a distinct difference in approach to that
adopted in strategic partnering  and other cooperative forms of project delivery.
As the project development progressed additional contractors joined the alliance
each bringing their own creative and critical thinking abilities to contribute to the
project design and delivery solution. The pre-sanction estimate—the target costs
that determines a project's ability to justify itself as a business case—is an
important and critical milestone in delivering engineering projects. The alliancing
approach also included an agreement to challenge and interrogate suggestions
as they emerged so that the most intelligent solutions survived scrutiny. This
demanded a highly professional approach by all concerned and a lack of being
'precious' about standard or 'business as usual' approaches. The result was that
the design encapsulated detailed planning and feasibility analysis as a part of the
decision making process. It appears to have been effective in transferring some
of the cost of estimating to forming the alliance. This approach was evidently
worthwhile to the participating contractors as other transaction costs were
minimised through using a collaborative approach. For example, the project's
commitment to minimising field inspections, eliminating expediting, pursuing
functional specification and reducing vendor documentation was achieved
leading to a radical new strategy for interfacing with suppliers.
A 30% reduction across the project total acquisition cost for equipment and
materials was aimed for. This allowed Andrew to be properly planned and a more
focussed and reliable estimate to be produced. Also, the presence of only 13 BP
personnel integrated into the team reinforced the fact that Andrew was definitely
not a business as usual approach for BP. The more enlightened management
approach of collaborating with BP as a partner bore fruit because contractors
took responsibility for their actions and proposals as well as determining self-
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imposed targets and standards. Trust and commitment flourished and the results
were demonstrable.
The Andrew platform and pipeline facilities estimate was £334 million with a £39
million contingency sum as opposed to the previous BP estimate of £450 million.
The alliance estimate was subjected to an independent check by BP's cost and
risk experts and their assessment was that the project had a 38% probability of
being completed in that price (based on their historical data for the North Sea).
BP would normally expect a 50% probability as an acceptable sanction figure and
it would traditionally bear additional cost overruns. The alliance partners had
proposed that under the risk and reward approach they would share an overrun
should it occur, up to a cost of £50 million. At this additional cost the probability of
achieving the estimate rose to 80% but at this level, the contractor's profits would
be outweighed by their expenditure. Their commitment won the alliance their
proposal. Relative shares of responsibility are illustrated in Table 4-13 below.
Table 4-13 Andrew Risk/Reward Sharing Model (Source: KPMG [9])
Participant Responsibility Area Responsibility
Share
BP Operator 46%
Brown & Root Project Management and detailed engineering 22%
BARMAC Jacket, template and piling fabrication 6%
TJB Deck and topside fabrication 12%
Saipem Platform transportation and installation 6%
Allseas Pipeline installation 4%
Santa Fe Platform drilling facilities and well construction 3%
Emtunga Accommodation 1%
Each of the alliance contractors entered into an individual commercial contract
with BP, against well-defined scopes of work, totalling some £217 million.
Payment methods followed one of two main types: either as manhours,
reimbursed at cost with fixed overhead and profit, or as fixed lump sum contracts
with milestones dates (similar to the concept of on-call contracting [38] described
in Chapter 2).  In addition, the costs of as yet unawarded contracts were included
along with BP's own management costs, to reach the work estimate. In a radical
departure from conventional project practice, the alliance contractors were asked
to take responsibility for a percentage of any cost savings or overruns that
Andrew might potentially produce. BP claimed that the project was completed 6
months ahead of schedule and came under the target cost by approximately £80
million. The risk/reward sharing arrangement, which clearly demonstrated
potential advantages of the alliance concept, was illustrated in Table 4-13.
4.10.3. East Spar Development - Western Australia
(Source: Australian Construction Association  [10])
This project involved development of a gas condensate field 40 kilometres
offshore west of Barrow Island in Western Australia. Design and construction
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took place between February 1995 and November 1996 at a cost of A$270
million. A number of consortia submitted an expression of interest to the client
Western Mining Corporation (WMC) . Three contracting parties Clough/Kvaerner
the joint venture proposers, and the owner/operators formed an alliance with the
owner. An alliance board was then established with two representatives from all
three parties to the alliance. Their role included selection of the Project Manager
and Section Managers.  A rigorous reporting system was established. The design
concept and budgets were then fully developed by the alliance with full open
disclosure and airing of all issues. This included the development of a risk and
reward model to share profits and losses as illustrated in Figure 4-12 below.
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Figure 4-12 East Spar Alliance Risk/reward - Model (Source: Australian
Constructors Association [10, p31]).
In establishing a target cost there was some difficulty involved in the Owner and
Contractors agreeing the target cost. The parties reached an acceptable
compromise with two targets approximately 10% apart.  The agreement allowed
for a sharing ratio of 1:6 between the two-target estimate ranges and 1:2 outside
those ranges. The alliance arrangement allowed both flexibility of design detailing
within an integrated Owner/Contractor team, even with a number of major design
changes the costs fell close to the client's target point.
4.10.4. Fluor Daniel SECV  - Victoria
(Source: Lendrum [117, p321-328])
Fluor Daniel pioneered partnering in engineering, construction and maintenance
in the USA. In October 1992 the then State Electricity Commission of Victoria
(SECV) reviewed its competitiveness and concluded that considerable cost
saving could be made through reform of the way it operated and procured
services. It identified a 35% cost reduction being required to maintain
competitiveness with New South Wales and Queensland electricity generating
and supply markets. With the prospect of a national electricity grid emerging, the
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challenge was real and vital. The Victorian Government decided upon a policy of
outsourcing non-core business and tender reform. Maintenance was targeted as
a prime candidate for reform. Several key managers of the SECV visited Fluor
Daniel's USA operations and customers and in July 1993 Fluor Daniel was
awarded the maintenance of Loy Yang A Power Station in Victoria followed by
two other power stations comprising 71% of the La Trobe Valley generating
capacity. The scope of activities included maintenance services, major and minor
unit overhauls, small and large capital initiatives, management of preferred
contractors and suppliers, and procurement and stores management. This was
accomplished while re-deploying a skilled SECV workforce committed to the
values and objectives of the partnership. This required a special flexibility
because much of the unscheduled and emergency maintenance work required
committed staff to be deployed at short notice for weeks and sometimes months
at a time. Thus, the strategic partnership arrangement required excellent
industrial relations skills and the negotiation of an enterprise agreement to
facilitate the levels of flexibility required.
This case study is different from previous ones discussed in a number of
respects. The strategic partnering arrangement spans numerous sub-projects
and so it is more of an operational alliance than a construction project specific
alliance. It is also bound up with the outsourcing issue and general reform of the
procurement process. There are pertinent similarities although.
· Costs are reimbursable with unneeded contingencies eliminated;
· Fluor Daniel's profits are based on a structured incentive program
based upon innovation and technological change, both large and small
sub-project outage performance, and specific client business targets;
· Open book access and shared goals; and
· Shared vision and common objectives.
4.10.5. Other Alliance Projects Undertaken in Australia
Alliancing is an increasingly popular procurement project delivery choice in the
USA, UK and Australia. Experience thus far is limited but encouraging. The
KPMG report cites the NSW Rail Access Corporation's Maintenance Contracts,
Sydney Water Corporation's Northside Storage Tunnel Contract and W.A. Water
Corporation's Waste Water Treatment Plant Contract as 1997 and 1998
examples [9]. In a recent article on project alliancing , several alliance projects are
mentioned including cautious comment about cost blowouts on the Northside
Tunnel Project and BHP's Port Headland HBI Project [132]. In that same article
there is also a brief description of the ElectraNet SA alliance with Kilpatrick Green
and Burns and Roe Worley in South Australia. Clearly, despite some perceived
shortcomings, alliancing is recognised as a valid and useful option which
continues to attract considered support and attention.
4.11. Chapter Summary
Alliancing has emerged as a procurement choice in response to several stimuli.
Companies form alliances as a competitive  tool to further their advantage. Their
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motivation may be threefold in response to the globalisation of business and
competition [89].
First, firms use alliances to build critical mass of expertise and service/product
offerings. Critical mass in the construction industry allows a firm to provide very
high levels of expertise across a widen range of specialisation. Critical mass also
refers to access to specialised equipment management systems and balance
sheet financial resources. For large-scale projects the cost of tendering alone
may be daunting—so the risk response to sharing risk with compatible and
complementary partners makes sense. This may be achieved through co-opting
potential competitors to strengthen a perceived weakness in any single firm to be
able to compete with the strongest. In non-strategic alliancing  conditions this is
often achieved through a joint venture (JV) arrangement. A JV would be a more
common response for undertaking large-scale BOOT infrastructure projects. A
critical mass of specialisation skills may be lacking for highly complex or highly
specialised projects so in those cases an alliance makes sense. If a firm builds a
hub of alliance partnerships with other firms, it can place itself in an equally
strong position to larger more highly resourced firms with a wider range of skills,
expertise and organisational knowledge [131].
Second, firms may wish to reach new markets through forming alliances with
local firms and developing the specialised local knowledge and networked links
of local companies. This is similar to the idea of using local factories in the
manufacturing sector as a strategy for building new strengths to compete  against
'foreign' companies. This approach also leverages skills and diversity of 'local'
firms to allow development of new products/services that can be exported or
returned to the host firm's location [118, 119, 145]. Thus, new opportunities and
new products can be created [89].
Third, skill gaps are strengthened. This is different from forming alliances to
provide a skill gap. This is related to the internalisation of valuable knowledge
from a partner through alliancing. When firms form alliances they work together
co-operatively sharing knowledge, ideas and feedback on systems and
processes. Thus, by being exposed to diverse sources of critique and to new
skills, firms can capture that knowledge resource, digest it (internalise it) and use
this to competitive  advantage. New competencies are built in this way [89].
Clients of construction projects may use alliancing  for the same reasons as
stated above for other firms. Government departments, large multi-national
enterprises and other significant developers have their own limited in-house
expertise to manage projects. They can effectively use alliancing to gain and
internalise knowledge (to be better at their involvement in overseeing future
projects as more sophisticated clients) and/or to build an in-house capacity.
Case studies and much of the alliancing and partnering literature indicates that
alliancing and strategic partnering is appropriate for highly complex projects,
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where there is simply insufficient time to independently develop a brief and
design and proceed through the traditional tendering  process [49, 89, 117, 127].
Moreover, strategic alliancing has also emerged as a response to the need to
use the specialised knowledge of contractors and designers to minimise wasted
time and redundant design in achieving buildable solutions that are leveraged
from the contractors practical knowledge. The value of constructability/buildability
and value analysis has been well understood for many years now [19, 20, 28, 34,
146]. Thus, clients appear to favour alliancing as a response to project
complexity under circumstances of tight timeframes where cost budgets can be
better formulated and controlled in an atmosphere of trust and commitment. This
approach also seems to deliver aligned joint project objectives.
This chapter began with a discussion on the changing framework for
organisational design to facilitate project goals . It was seen that with higher levels
of rapid change, complexity and need for rapid responsiveness, traditional
organisational structures are not adequately coping with current demands. The
relevance of postcorporate organisational structures to managing today's projects
was discussed and four management blueprints were outlined. The Fourth
Blueprint was offered as an appropriate model by implementing strategic
alliances to cope with the new dimensions of business complexity facing clients
in the 21st Century.
The linking discussion of enterprise networks and team spirit was important
because this linkage forms the foundations of strategic partnering and strategic
alliances. Qualitative aspects of relationships are pivotal to successful alliancing,
so it is appropriate that the drivers of trusting relationships should be explored
and explained. The logical successor to this discussion should be a discussion
on types of partnerships and alliances. The work of Lendrum [117] is useful in
this context. A detailed discussion of forms of partnering and alliancing followed.
This brought forward the opportunity to discuss in detail the results of the CIIA
study of partnering [121]. This is expected to be demonstrated as a seminal study
that will claim its place in the literature of relationship contracting in Australia. The
study brings with it interesting and valuable insights into the way that partnering
operates in the current climate. At the same time, other partnering studies from
overseas were discussed. This explains the important differences between
partnering and alliancing—a concept that has been poorly understood.
It was also important to explore the journey when undertaking alliancing . The
idea of strategic relationship development and maintenance was discussed. It is
of little use to develop a relationship, an organic entity dependent upon
sustenance and nurturing, without considering how such a relationship can be
maintained. To do otherwise would be to take a shallow and unrealistic approach.
The discussion moved on towards a model of creating effective alliance
partnerships. The selection criteria used on the Australian National Museum
project was discussed as it provides an interesting, novel and advanced concept
congruent with the notions expressed by triple bottom line theory [7]. Finally
Chapter 4 - Enterprise Networks, Partnering and Alliancing
_________________________________________________________________
Page 101
some 'how to' aspects were discussed as they apply to the literature on
alliancing. A selection process was offered [9] and case studies were provided to
elaborate on issues of practice as well as theory.
In documenting history, particularly the history of a rapidly evolving story such as
alliance procurement systems, there is bound to be errors of omission. Reviews
of the literature are constrained by an attempt to maintain a brief yet a pertinent
coverage of the topic. The role of continued study of a topic is to continually
question what is observed and experienced and to attempt to seek relevance to
current issues, and to place experience into historical context. It is easy and
perhaps trite to label various developments as 'fads'. Partnering  has been shown
to be a genuine attempt to solve a deteriorating problem in procurement whereby
working relationships between contracted partners dissolve into a morass of
legalise and confrontationalist approaches. This book attempts to discern
between strategic partnering and alliancing . This may be judged by future
researchers to be an irrelevant concept or a defining concept. Time will tell.
The evidence provided for indicating where a relationship based procurement
approach is appropriate is both strong and well supported. Projects such as the
Australian National Museum will provide deeper insights and it is fortunate that
the Australian Government has funded research to identify, track and critically
examine the performance of alliancing and its intricacies as experienced on that
project.  Any review of the literature is snap-frozen in time, influenced by the
availability of information and the culture of the time. It is hoped that this
publication will provide a useful basis for study and re-evaluation of theory and
practice based upon reflections of actual experiences and the expanding body of
knowledge of this topic.
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From a contractor's perspective, this book goes a long way to addressing the critical
relationship issues for a more collaborative and sustainable construction industry.
Alliance contracting—encouraging closer relationships between clients, designers,
contractors and sub-contractors—can only enhance the environment that we have
struggled to operate in, this past few decades.
In 1996, the Australian Contractors Association developed our industry guide
Relationship Contracting. This publication, in concert with the Commonwealth
Government's focus on construction industry improvement has assisted in the
cultural change I now see emerging in the Australian Construction Industry.
In my role, as Chair of the Construction Industry Institute (CII) Australia, I have
overseen a number of reports focusing on the human and contractual elements of
construction. This book advances previous research in the context of the National
Museum Project in Canberra, and provides a most valuable focus of the sociology of
teams and delivering constructed facilities more effectively.
